Essays in macroeconomics, international trade and the environment by Sikdar, Shiva
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2008
Essays in macroeconomics, international trade and
the environment
Shiva Sikdar
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economic Theory Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sikdar, Shiva, "Essays in macroeconomics, international trade and the environment" (2008). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations.
15833.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/15833
Essays in macroeconomics, international trade and the environment
by
Shiva Sikdar
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Major: Economics
Program of Study Committee:
Harvey E. Lapan, Co-major Professor
P. Marcelo Oviedo, Co-major Professor
Joydeep Bhattacharya
Arnold R. Cowan
Jinhua Zhao
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
2008
Copyright c© Shiva Sikdar, 2008. All rights reserved.
3316189 
 
3316189 
 2008
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL BANKING SECTOR RECAPITALIZATION . . 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 Firms and the Working Capital Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.3 Banks and Banking Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.4 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.5 Competitive Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Optimal Bank Recapitalization Programs: A Ramsey Approach . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 Labor Income Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 Lump-sum Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.3 Government Access to International Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Quantitative Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.1 Functional Forms and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2 Transition Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.3 Welfare Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
iii
2.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER FREE
TRADE WITH TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Autarky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 Efficient Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Free Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.1 Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5.2 Quotas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5.3 Tradable Quotas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5.4 Pollution and Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6 Generalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.6.1 Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6.2 Quotas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6.3 Tradable Quotas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6.4 Pollution and Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
CHAPTER 4. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND STRATEGIC ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3 Autarky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Efficient Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.5 Free Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5.1 Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5.2 Quotas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.6 Special Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
iv
4.6.1 Case 1: (β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗) = 0, ηθ > η∗θ∗ . . . . . . . . 77
4.6.2 Case 2: (β − α) = (β∗ − α∗), θ∗ = θ, λ = 1, η > η∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.6.3 Case 3: (β − α) > (β∗ − α∗), η∗ = η, θ∗ = θ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
vLIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 Baseline parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Table 2.2 Steady state values under baseline parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Table 2.3 Welfare effects of banking crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 Dynamics in the aftermath of a banking crisis under the three recapi-
talization programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figure 2.2 Welfare costs of banking crises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my co-major professors,
Harvey E. Lapan and P. Marcelo Oviedo, for their guidance, patience and support throughout
this research and the writing of this dissertation. I am indebted to my committee members,
Joydeep Bhattacharya, Arnie Cownan and Jinhua Zhao, for their insightful comments on this
work. I would also like to thank Rajesh Singh for his suggestions regarding this dissertation.
viii
ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses the problem of optimal recapitalization of banking sectors after
banking crises and analyzes the effect of trade liberalization on environmental policy and
welfare in a strategic setting in the presence of transboundary pollution.
Government-financed bank restructuring programs, occasionally costing up to 50% of GDP,
have commonly been used to resolve banking crises. In Chapter 2 we analyze the Ramsey-
optimal paths of bank recapitalization programs that weigh recapitalization benefits and costs
under different financing options. In our model bank credit is essential, due to a working capital
constraint on firms, and banks are financial intermediaries that borrow from households and
lend to firms. A banking crisis produces a disruption of credit and a fall in output equivalent
to those in developing countries affected by banking crises. Full recapitalization of the banking
system immediately after the crisis is optimal only if international credit is available. One-shot
recapitalization is not optimal with domestically-financed programs, even if the government
has access to non-distortionary taxes. The welfare cost of a crisis is substantial: the equivalent
permanent decline in the no-crisis steady state consumption ranges between 0.51% and 0.65%,
depending on the source of financing the recapitalization program.
In Chapter 3 we analyze the effects of free trade on environmental policies in a strategic
setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to
the bottom in environmental outcomes, which makes both countries worse off. In our model
it is not the terms of trade motive, but the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the
incidence of transboundary pollution, that drives countries to relax domestic environmental
policy. When command and control policies such as quotas are used instead of taxes, countries
are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is
ix
no race to the bottom. However, when permits are tradable across countries, unless pollution
is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. In the free
trade equilibrium, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level, while
the relative ranking of pollution in the internationally tradable quota equilibrium and the tax
equilibrium depends on the relative magnitudes of domestic and transboundary pollution and
the relative slopes of the demand and supply schedules. The nontradable quota equilibrium
strictly welfare-dominates the tax equilibrium.
Chapter 4 extends the model of the previous chapter to explicitly model differences between
countries that may lead to trade in equilibrium. We analyze the effect of trade liberalization
on pollution policy and welfare in the presence of both the terms of trade motives and the
transboundary pollution effect. We find that, when countries use taxes to regulate pollution,
the importer of the polluting good unambiguously lowers its tax as a result of trade liberaliza-
tion, while the exporter of the polluting good reduces (increases) its tax if the transboundary
pollution (terms of trade) effect dominates. It is possible for both countries to be worse off
due to trade liberalization. When the only source of comparative advantage is a difference in
the preference towards pollution, then aggregate (world) welfare is higher under free trade as
compared to autarky if countries use quotas to regulate pollution, but is lower under free trade
relative to autarky if the policy instrument in both countries is a pollution tax.
1CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyzes the optimal path of banking sector recapitalization programs in
the aftermath of a banking crisis and the effects of a movement from autarky to free trade on
domestic environmental policy, pollution and welfare when, in the presence of a transboundary
pollution externality, countries strategically set their domestic environmental policies.
Banking sector problems leading to bank insolvencies have been frequent in recent decades
in developed and developing countries. Given the serious macroeconomic consequences of
banking crises, governments often end up recapitalizing the banking sector after a crisis. The
high fiscal cost of such programs warrants a careful analysis of the optimal path of recapital-
ization given the financing options available to the government. In Chapter 2 we analyze the
optimal path of a bank recapitalization program that weights the recapitalization benefits and
the program’s costs. We focus on the aftermath of a banking crisis when a large fraction of
the banking capital stock has already been eroded and the banking system is providing just a
fraction of the efficient level of financial intermediation.
In our model, banks accept deposits from households and lend to firms. Firms need to
borrow from banks due to a working capital constraint which requires them to pay for their
input before the sales of their product. Following the empirical literature, we define a banking
crisis as a decline in the bank capital stock, which leads to a decline in the loan supply. The
consequent rise in the interest rate on loans leads firms to reduce their demand for inputs,
which, in turn, causes a decline in employment and production.
We characterize optimal bank recapitalization programs by formulating a Ramsey planner’s
problem, where the planner chooses a bank recapitalization program that can be implemented
as a competitive equilibrium. The optimal program depends on the financing options available
2to the government.
When the government can borrow from international debt markets to finance the recapital-
ization program, it is able to recapitalize the banking system immediately and achieve perfect
consumption smoothing. One-shot recapitalization is not optimal with domestically-financed
programs, even if the government has access to non-distortionary taxes. The welfare cost of a
crisis is substantial: the equivalent permanent decline in the no-crisis steady state consumption
is 0.51% when the government has access to international debt and 0.63% (0.65%) when the
recapitalization program is financed by lump-sum (labor-income) taxes.
A serious concern about the relationship between trade and environmental policy is that
these two issues have usually been dealt with separately in bilateral or multilateral agreements.
Chapter 3 explores the effects of trade liberalization on environmental outcomes and welfare, in
the presence of transboundary pollution, when environmental policy is set non-cooperatively.
We use a two good, two country trade model in which production of one of the goods generates
pollution as a by-product. Pollution reduces welfare in both countries, but does not affect the
production possibility set. We compare different policy instruments within this framework
when countries strategically set environmental policies.
We find that, in the symmetric equilibrium, if governments use taxes, the movement from
autarky to free trade can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes that results
in both countries being worse off under free trade relative to autarky. The motive behind the
under-regulation of the polluting sector is not the terms of trade motive but the transboundary
pollution effect, i.e., the incentive to under-regulate domestic pollution to reduce the incidence
of transboundary pollution from abroad, which partly offsets the benefits of tighter domestic
pollution policies.
When the policy instrument in both countries is a production or pollution limit, then, in
the symmetric equilibrium, changes in domestic policy do not affect foreign production (hence,
foreign emissions) and there is no incentive to distort domestic policy. Thus, there is no race
to the bottom in environmental policy.
However, if international trade in emission permits is allowed, then a race to the bottom
3in environmental policies will occur if pollution is not a pure global public bad, but not when
pollution is a pure global public bad. In the symmetric free trade equilibrium, pollution is
lowest with internationally nontradable quotas. We find that the internationally nontradable
emissions quota equilibrium is strictly welfare-superior to the emissions tax equilibrium. The
welfare ranking of the internationally tradable quota equilibrium and the tax equilibrium de-
pends on the severity of transboundary pollution and the relative slopes of the demand and
supply schedules.
We then generalize the model to allow for production of both goods to generate pollution
as a by-product, the possibility of substitutability between polluting and non-polluting inputs,
and abatement. The results derived earlier in the chapter continue to hold.
Chapter 4 extends the analysis of Chapter 3 and explicitly models differences between the
countries with respect to their production possibility functions and preferences. We model
different scenarios that may lead to equilibrium trade between the countries and analyze the
effect of a movement from autarky to free trade when countries strategically set domestic
policies in the presence of a transboundary pollution externality.
The transboundary pollution effect tends to lower the environmental tax, irrespective of
the pattern of trade while the terms of trade effect depends on the trade pattern. We find that,
in the presence of terms of trade effects, the importer of the polluting good lowers its domestic
environmental tax under free trade relative to autarky; this is because, both the terms of trade
effect and the transboundary pollution effect reinforce each other to reduce the domestic tax.
However, in the exporter of the polluting good, the terms of trade and transboundary pollution
effect work in opposite directions. So, the effect of trade liberalization on the environmental
tax depends on which of the two effects dominates. The welfare effect of trade liberalization
depends on whether the gains from the opportunity of trade dominates the loss due to increased
pollution.
We then analyze the case when countries use quotas to regulate pollution. Production of
the polluting good declines in the importing country and it increases in the exporter of the
polluting good due to trade liberalization. The difference in the pollution intensity between
4the two countries and the severity of transboundary pollution, together determine whether
pollution increases or decreases due to a movement from autarky to free trade.
When pollution is a pure global public bad and the only difference between countries is
their preference towards pollution, then the country with a higher marginal disutility from
pollution unambiguously lowers its pollution tax due to trade liberalization, while the other
country may also reduce its tax. Production of the polluting good in both countries is higher
under free trade relative to autarky and so is pollution. The country with preference for
cleaner environment is worse off and the other country may be worse off, but aggregate (world)
welfare is lower as a result of a movement from autarky to free trade, when countries use taxes
to regulate domestic pollution. However, if governments use command and control policies
(quotas) to regulate pollution, there is no effect on pollution and total world production of the
polluting good when countries move from from autarky to free trade. The country with lower
(higher) marginal disutility from pollution is better (worse) off, but aggregate (world) welfare
is unambiguously higher under free trade as compared to autarky. Hence, from the aggregate
perspective, the free trade quota equilibrium is welfare-superior to the tax equilibrium.
Chapter 5 provides a summary and brief concluding remarks.
5CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL BANKING SECTOR RECAPITALIZATION
(This chapter is a close version of Oviedo and Sikdar (2007).)
2.1 Introduction
Banking sector problems leading to bank insolvencies have been frequent in recent decades
in developed and developing countries alike. Lindgreen et al. (1996) report that, between 1980
and 1996, 133 of the 181 of IMF’s member countries have experienced significant banking sector
problems, including numerous banking crises. Along the same lines, Caprio and Klingebiel
(2003) report that between the late 1970s and 2002, there were 117 systemic banking crises -
defined as much or all of the banking capital being exhausted - in 93 countries.
The macroeconomic consequences of banking crises are well documented. In their study of
36 banking crises in 35 countries between 1980 and 1995, Demiirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2006) define
a “banking crisis as a period in which segments of the banking system become illiquid or in-
solvent” and find that banking crises commonly cause sharp declines in output growth rates.
Moreover, financial distress helps in propagating the adverse shocks to the real sectors of the
economy when banks reduce lending to creditworthy borrowers. Likewise, the harmful macroe-
conomic consequences of banking sector problems have been identified in the U.S. economic
history during periods of banking-sector distress. Romer (1993), for instance, suggests that
“. . . the banking crises of 1931 and later were a crucial cause of the deepening and sustaining
of the Great Depression in the United States . . . ”.
The real effects of banking crises are worse for sectors that have very limited alternatives to
bank financing, something that applies across the board in developing countries. The evidence
in this regard found by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2005) lead them to subscribe to the view that banks
6need to be supported during distress in order to prevent a vicious circle in which banking
distress and economic contraction reinforce each other.
A sound banking system is oftentimes considered a public good that is essential for macroe-
conomic stability, so it is not surprising to see governments get drawn into the costly process
of recapitalizing bankrupt banks in the aftermath of a banking crisis. Honohan and Klingebiel
(2000) find that in their sample of 40 crisis-countries, governments end up bearing most of the
direct costs of the crises. Fiscal resolution costs average about 13% of GDP in general, and
14.3% in developing countries. However, these fiscal costs are, at best, a lower bound on the re-
sources involved in remedying the effects of a banking crisis since actual costs are substantially
higher due to indirect methods of government assistance, and the buildup of direct liabilities
from state owned banks and of contingent liabilities from deposit and credit guarantees (see
Daniel et al. (1997)). According to Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), an overall estimate of the
amount of resources involved in bank restructuring programs is between 10 and 20% of GDP
in most cases and occasionally as much as 40-55% of GDP.
Not only is the expenditure side of the fiscal balance affected by a banking crisis, the
revenue side is hit as well. The general slowdown of the economy following a banking crisis
substantially reduces tax bases and therefore tax revenues. All in all, a banking crisis is a costly
(and recurrent in some countries) phenomenon that produces serious adverse macroeconomic
consequences and has enormous negative effects on fiscal balances, mostly because the public-
good aspect of a well functioning banking system leads the government to restore the system
after a crisis.
This chapter characterizes Ramsey-optimal bank restructuring programs from the public
finance viewpoint and seeks to answer the following question: once a government decides to
recapitalize a bankrupt banking sector, what is the optimal path of a program that weights the
recapitalization benefits and the program’s costs? To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
attempt at formally analyzing the problem of recapitalizing a bankrupt banking system in the
aftermath of a banking crisis that takes into account the fact that the costs of funding such a
program depend on the government’s sources of funding the program.
7To focus on the public finance aspect of the problem, we abstract from the causes of
the banking crises and the moral hazard problems arising from government intervention in a
financial system. Instead, we analyze the resolution of a banking crisis once it has occurred and
the government has already decided to restructure the economy’s bankrupt banking system.1
Thus, instead of focusing on panics or serious liquidity dry-outs, we focus on the aftermath of
a banking crisis when a large fraction of the banking capital stock has already been eroded and
the banking system is providing just a fraction of the efficient level of financial intermediation.
By recapitalizing undercapitalized banks we refer to the injection of banking capital that
restores the ability of these banks to intermediate financial credit at an efficient level.
We conduct our analysis by modeling a perfect foresight economy that is hit by an unfore-
seen banking crisis. Following the empirical literature, we define a banking crisis as an event
in which much or all of the bank capital is depleted (see Caprio and Klingebiel (2003)). We
model banks following Cole and Ohanian (2000) and, in our model, the banking sector is a
financial intermediary that borrows from households and lends to firms. Bank deposits are
the only saving mechanism available to households; banks intermediate these deposits to lend
to the firms, which face a working-capital constraint that requires them to pay their wage bill
before cashing their sales. Government outlays comprise of a fixed government consumption
and, in the event of a banking crisis, the costs of recapitalizing the banking system.
The mechanism through which output and employment plummet in the aftermath of a crisis
is as follows. A decline in the stock of banking capital leads to a decline in the loan supply. The
consequent rise in the interest rate on working-capital loans leads firms to reduce their demand
for inputs, which in turn causes a decline in production. For similar reasons, replenishing bank
capital raises the volume of financial intermediation, increases the loan supply, reduces interest
rates, and thereby stimulates output and employment in the aftermath of a crisis.
To characterize efficient programs, we formulate a Ramsey planner’s problem in which
the government has to choose a bank restructuring program that can be implemented as a
competitive equilibrium. The government’s objective, in the aftermath of a banking crisis, is
1Although we abstract from the these moral hazard problems, it must be said that recapitalizing undercap-
italized banks does not necessarily mean maintaining the management nor the ownership of the bank charter.
8to endow the economy with the benefits of a well running banking system but internalizing the
direct and indirect resource costs of the recapitalization program. Thus, the optimal program
hinges upon the means by which the government funds it. In particular, we characterize the
optimal bank restructuring program under three alternative sources of public revenue. In the
first case, the rebuilding of the banking sector can only be financed with distortionary labor
taxes. In the second case, we allow the government to resort to lump-sum taxes to fund
the restructuring program. And in the third case, while we rule out lump-sum taxes, the
government has access to international debt markets to finance the recapitalization program.
We find that only when the government has access to international credit, is it optimal
to fully recapitalize the banking system in the period following the crisis. With domestically-
financed recapitalization programs, however, even when non-distortionary taxes are available,
it is never optimal to recapitalize the banks in one period. Our results contrast those found in
the literature dealing with the microeconomic aspects of bank restructuring policy which, by
abstracting from the public finance aspect of the problem, always recommends an immediate,
full recapitalization of banks to prevent further loss of confidence in the problem-ridden banking
system.
To fix ideas about our results, consider the case where the government has access to in-
ternational debt to fund the bank recapitalization program. The banking system is bankrupt
in the initial period and the loss of banking capital submerges the economy into a recession
in that period. By borrowing abroad, the government is able to secure the funds necessary to
recapitalize the banks, so the economy quickly recovers from the recession in the next period.
Moreover, using international debt, the government can also provide subsidies to the house-
holds to alleviate the effects of the recession until the banking crisis is resolved in the next
period. From then on it is optimal to smooth out the distortionary taxes so that the debt
incurred to finance the bank restructuring program is rolled over forever. Thus, with access to
international credit, full, one-period recapitalization of the banks is optimal.
Results are different when the economy lacks access to external credit to finance the re-
capitalization program and the government has to resort to domestic taxation. Assume first
9that lump-sum taxes are available. Fully recapitalizing the banks in one period is not optimal
because lump-sum taxes, despite being non-distortionary, withdraw large amounts of resources
from the private sector which causes a decline in consumption and hence in welfare. Con-
sumption smoothing thus entails that the government replenish the stock of banking capital
gradually. When only distortionary labor taxes are available, recapitalization of the bankrupt
banking sector is even slower. This is because labor-income taxation, apart from withdrawing
resources from consumption, distorts the consumption-leisure choice of the households.
Quantitative results from the numerical solution of the model, calibrated to match basic
macroeconomic ratios in developing countries, indicate the following: a banking crisis results in
a welfare loss equivalent to a 5.51% permanent decline in the no-crisis steady state consumption
if the government does not intervene. When the recapitalization program is financed by labor-
income taxes, the economy reaches the new steady state in 23 periods, and the resulting
welfare loss is 0.65%. With lump-sum taxes available to the government, convergence to the
new steady state occurs in 22 periods, with the welfare loss being reduced to 0.63%. Access to
international debt mitigates the above welfare loss to 0.51% reduction in the no-crisis steady
state consumption and the new steady state is reached in two periods.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present the perfect-
foresight, decentralized, general equilibrium model. We formulate the corresponding Ramsey
problem in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the quantitative results and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We model a perfect-foresight economy with four types of agents: households, goods-
producing firms, banks and the government. Firms, which along with the banks, are owned by
the households, need working capital to pay their wage bill before cashing their output’s sale
proceeds. Banks intermediate by borrowing savings from households and by lending working
capital to the firms. Firms’ technology combine capital and labor to produce output, while
banks’ technology uses deposits and bank capital to produce loans.
To guarantee the consistency of the intertemporal household’s deposit decisions with the
10
(essentially) atemporal banks’ and firms’ optimization problems involving credit, we follow
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) to assume that there are two times within each period t. One at
the beginning of the period, denoted by t−, and one at the end of the period, denoted by t+.
We assume that t+ and (t + 1)− are arbitrarily close. At t− banks accept deposits, dt, from
the households and use them along with the stock of banking capital, At, to produce loans
instantaneously. Firms need to borrow from the banks to fulfill their working capital constraint
at t−. Labor is hired and paid using loans from the banks at t−. Firms use the hired labor
and the capital stock to produce the final good which becomes available at t+. Firms repay
their loans along with interest, Rbtbt, to the banks at t+. Firms’ and banks’ profits, pi
f
t and
pibt respectively, along with the gross interest income, Rtdt, are distributed to the households;
the household allocates these resources between consumption, ct, and savings, in the form of
one-period deposits in the banks, dt+1. Within each period, the government collects taxes and
uses the proceeds to pay for its outlays which include the fixed government expenditure, g¯,
and may also include other transfers related to the recapitalization of the banking system.
2.2.1 Households
The representative household has an infinite life and chooses sequences of consumption,
labor supply, and bank deposits, {ct, ht, dt+1}∞t=0, to maximize the following lifetime discounted
utility
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, lt) (2.1)
where β is a standard discount factor and U is a strictly concave, increasing, and differentiable
utility index that depends on consumption, ct, and leisure, lt. The time endowment is normal-
ized to 1, hence labor effort is ht = 1 − lt. The utility maximization problem is subject to a
flow budget constraint,
ct + dt+1 + Tt ≤ (1− τt)wtht +Rtdt + [pift + pibt ]; t ≥ 0 (2.2)
that restricts the household’s expenditure to not exceed its income at any time. The sources
of income are net labor income, gross return on deposits, and dividends. Net labor income
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depends on the wage rate, wt, the amount of labor supplied, ht, and the tax rate on labor
income, τt. Bank deposits, dt, are the only savings vehicle available to the household and
they are remunerated at the gross rate Rt. Furthermore, as the household owns all firms and
banks in the economy, it collects the respective profits, pift and pi
b
t . The household allocates its
resources between savings, dt+1, i.e., deposits payable next period, consumption, ct, and the
payment of the lump-sum tax, Tt.
A sequence {ct, ht, dt+1}∞t=0 is optimal from the household’s standpoint if it satisfies the
resource constraint in Eq. (2.2) with equality and if the following conditions hold at t ≥ 0:
Ul(t)
Uc(t)
= (1− τt)wt (2.3)
Uc(t) = βUc(t+ 1)Rt+1 (2.4)
where Uc(t) and Ul(t) are the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure at time t. Eq.
(2.3) equates the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption to the wage rate net
of taxes, and Eq. (2.4) is a standard dynamic efficiency condition for savings that governs
the optimal allocation of deposits. The tax on labor income lowers the net wage received by
the households, which reduces the consumption-leisure ratio. Thus the substitution effect of a
labor tax results in a fall in consumption and labor effort.
2.2.2 Firms and the Working Capital Constraint
The representative firm owns a fixed capital stock, k¯, which is combined with labor, ht, to
produce the final good, yt, using a constant returns to scale production function:
yt = f(k¯, ht) (2.5)
The firm faces a working capital constraint on its wage bill: it has to borrow from banks
to finance its labor costs before cashing its sales. Hence firms borrow bt (= wtht) from the
banks. Due to rents accruing to the fixed capital stock, the firm makes positive profits that are
distributed to the households. The firm chooses ht to maximize its profits, pi
f
t = yt −Rbtwtht,
taking as given the wage rate, wt, and the gross interest rate on its borrowing, Rbt. Optimality
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requires that:
Rbtwt = fh(k¯, ht) (2.6)
and linear homogeneity of the production function allows us to write the firm’s profit as:
pift = k¯fk(k¯, ht) (2.7)
which is the return to the stock of physical capital.
2.2.3 Banks and Banking Crises
Following Cole and Ohanian (2000), we model the representative bank as follows. The bank
accepts one-period deposits, dt, from households and uses them along with banking capital to
produce loans, bt, using a Leontief production function:
bt = min(γAt, dt); γ ∈ (0,∞) (2.8)
where At is the banking capital stock that is owned by the bank and it is in fixed supply (A¯) in
the pre-crisis equilibrium. The bank chooses dt to maximize its profits, pibt = (Rbt−1)bt−(Rt−
1)dt, taking as given the lending rate, Rbt, and the deposit rate, Rt. The bank’s maximization
problem leads to the following optimality condition:
bt = dt = γAt (2.9)
which equates the volume of loans to that of deposits and to γ times the banking capital stock.
We model a banking crisis by assuming an unanticipated exogenous decrease in the stock
of banking capital. This is in keeping with the banking crises documented in Chava and
Purnanandam (2006) and the definitions of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). If a crisis occurs in
period tc, the stock of banking capital declines from At = A¯ during the non-crisis times (i.e.,
∀t < tc), to Atc = A at the crisis time. It can then be seen from Eq. (2.9) that a crisis that
erodes a portion of the banking capital stock results in a decline in the supply of loans. We do
not model why nor how the crisis happens2; instead, we take the crisis as given and carry out
our analysis from period tc on to consider the optimal path of banking capital injections.
2See Demiirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) for a discussion of the causes of banking crises.
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2.2.4 Government
Regardless of the existence of a crisis or of an ongoing bank recapitalization program, we
assume that the government has a constant level of unproductive expenditures, g¯, which it
finances by resorting to lump-sum taxes. This assumption pursues a two-fold goal: it permits
matching the normal level of government expenditures to output ratio in developing countries
while isolating the effects of financing a bank recapitalization program from that of financing
normal government expenditures.
Following what has been observed in countries that have faced banking crises, we assume
that the government gets drawn into restructuring the banking sector, although this is shown
to be optimal in the model above when the private sector is ruled out from recapitalizing
the banks. When a crisis triggers the implementation of a bank recapitalization program, in
addition to g¯, the government has to spend xt to inject capital to the banking system. Capital
injections make the banking capital stock evolve according to At+1 = At+xt. We characterize
the optimal path of xt under alternative sources of financing the recapitalization program. The
general form of the government budget constraint is:
g¯ + xt +R∗b
g
t = τtwtht + b
g
t+1 + Tt (2.10)
where bgt is the time t stock of international debt issued by the government and R
∗ is the gross
interest rate on international debt. We will later specialize this constraint according to the
funding sources available to the government.
2.2.5 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations, {ct, ht, dt+1, At+1}∞t=0; a sequence
of prices, {wt}∞t=0; a sequence of interest rates, {Rt, Rbt}∞t=0; and a sequence of government
policies, {xt, τt, Tt, bgt+1}∞t=0, such that: a) households solve their constrained lifetime utility-
maximization problem, i.e., Eq.s (2.2) - (2.4) hold; b) firms maximize their profits, i.e., Eq.
(2.6) and the working capital constraint on the firm hold with equality; c) banks maximize
their profits, i.e., Eq. (2.9) holds; d) the government budget constraint is satisfied; and e) the
labor, output, deposit, and loan markets clear.
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2.3 Optimal Bank Recapitalization Programs: A Ramsey Approach
To characterize Ramsey-optimal bank recapitalization programs, in this section, we formu-
late the Ramsey problems corresponding to each of three sources of recapitalization financing:
i) the recapitalization is undertaken using revenue from labor-income taxes, ii) lump-sum taxes
finance the recapitalization, and iii) the government borrows in international debt markets to
recapitalize the banking sector and only distortionary taxes are available to repay the con-
tracted debt.
2.3.1 Labor Income Taxation
Consider the Ramsey planner’s problem when the government has to resort to taxation
of labor income to finance the recapitalization of the banking system. Here, ∀t, Tt = g¯ and
bgt = 0, so the government budget constraint, Eq. (2.10), becomes:
xt = At+1 −At = τtwtht (2.11)
The implementability constraint for the Ramsey planner is derived by substituting the house-
hold’s, firm’s and bank’s optimality conditions along with the expressions for the profits of
firms and banks into the household budget constraint:
Uc(t)[ct + γAt+1 + g¯ − f(k¯, ht)] = Ul(t)ht (2.12)
The resource constraint for the economy is derived by combining the household and the
government budget constraints:
ct + g¯ + (1 + γ)At+1 = (1 + γ)At + f(k¯, ht) (2.13)
The Ramsey planner’s problem is
max
{ct,ht,At+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, lt) s.t. (2.12), and (2.13)
Let βtµt be the multiplier on the implementability constraint and βtνt be the multiplier on
the resource constraint. Assuming Ulc(.) = Ucl(.) = 0, the optimality conditions are the
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implementability and resource constraints, Eq.s (2.12) and (2.13), along with the following:
Uc(t) = µt[Uc(t) + Ucc(t){ct + γAt+1 + g¯ − f(k¯, ht)}] + νt (2.14)
Ul(t) = µt[Ul(t)− Ull(t)ht + Uc(t)fh(k¯, ht)] + νtfh(k¯, ht) (2.15)
µtUc(t)γ + νt(1 + γ) = βνt+1(1 + γ) (2.16)
where Eq.s (2.14), (2.15), and (2.16) are the first order conditions with respect to ct, ht, and
At+1, respectively.
It is worth emphasizing that the above Ramsey planner’s problem is different from the
standard version of the Ramsey problem where the government has to fund a stream of un-
productive government expenditures. In our case the government needs to raise resources to
recapitalize the banking system, and given that banking capital is an essential input in the loan
production function, the government needs to finance a productive expenditure3. At designing
the optimal recapitalization path, the planner needs to balance the benefit of recapitalizing the
banking system with the costs of raising the resources to do so. On the cost side, apart from
withdrawing resources from consumption, the tax on labor income distorts the consumption-
leisure choice. The benefit of recapitalizing the banks is a better capitalized banking system
that is able to extend more loans at a lower interest rate to the firms, which in turn leads to
economywide increases in employment, output, and consumption.
2.3.2 Lump-sum Taxes
When the planner has access to lump-sum taxes to finance the recapitalization program
but the economy is excluded from international debt markets, bgt = τt = 0; in this case, the
government budget constraint can be written as:
g¯ +At+1 −At = Tt (2.17)
3Recent papers that consider Ramsey planner’s problems with productive public expenditure include Riascos
and Ve´gh (2004), and Klein et al. (2007) where government expenditure provides utility to consumers, while
Azzimonti et al. (2006) focus on time consistency issues when public capital is an input in private production.
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where it is understood that absent any recapitalization program, Tt = g¯. The household budget
constraint, Eq. (2.2), is now
ct + dt+1 + Tt ≤ wtht +Rtdt + [pift + pibt ]; t ≥ 0 (2.18)
In a standard Ramsey problem, when the planner has access to lump-sum taxes, and there
are no other distortions in the economy, the solution involves maximizing the household’s
objective function subject to the economywide resource constraint. In our case, however, the
working capital constraint acts as another distortion in the economy that requires imposing
the following implementability constraint on the Ramsey planner’s problem:
Uc(t)[ct + (1 + γ)At+1 + g¯ − f(k¯, ht)−At] = Ul(t)ht (2.19)
This constraint arises from substituting into the household’s budget constraint, Eq. (2.18), the
profit functions for the firms and banks, the household and bank optimality conditions, and
the value of the government capital injections. The resource constraint for the economy is the
same as before, and is repeated here for convenience:
ct + g¯ + (1 + γ)At+1 = (1 + γ)At + f(k¯, ht) (2.20)
The Ramsey planner’s problem is
max
{ct,ht,At+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, lt) s.t. (2.19), and (2.20)
Let βtµt and βtνt be the multipliers on the implementability constraint and the resource
constraint, respectively . Under the assumption that Ulc(.) = Ucl(.) = 0, optimality requires
satisfying the implementability and the resource constraints, Eq.s (2.19) and (2.20), as well as
the following conditions:
Uc(t) = µt[Uc(t) + Ucc(t){ct + (1 + γ)At+1 + g¯ − f(k¯, ht)−At}] + νt (2.21)
Ul(t) = µt[Ul(t)− Ull(t)ht + Uc(t)fh(k¯, ht)] + νtfh(k¯, ht) (2.22)
µtUc(t)(1 + γ) + νt(1 + γ) = βµt+1Uc(t+ 1) + βνt+1(1 + γ) (2.23)
17
where Eq.s (2.21), (2.22), and (2.23) are the first order conditions with respect to ct, ht, and
At+1, respectively.
Although the taxes are non-distortionary, the recapitalization program involves withdraw-
ing resources that, otherwise, would be allocated to consumption. The planner needs to balance
the cost of the current reduction in consumption with the current and future benefits of a better
capitalized banking system and this characterizes the optimal recapitalization path.
2.3.3 Government Access to International Debt
When the government has access to international debt and lump-sum taxes are available
only to fund the constant level of government expenditures, g¯, the resource constraint for the
economy is the following:
ct + g¯ + (1 + γ)At+1 +R∗b
g
t = (1 + γ)At + f(k¯, ht) + b
g
t+1 (2.24)
The implementability constraint in this case is:
Uc(t)[ct + γAt+1 + g¯ − f(k¯, ht)] = Ul(t)ht (2.25)
Thus, the Ramsey planner’s problem, when the government has access to international debt,
is
max
{ct,ht,At+1,bgt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, lt) s.t. (2.24), and (2.25)
As before, let βtµt be the multiplier on the implementability constraint and βtνt be the multi-
plier on the resource constraint, and assume that Ulc(.) = Ucl(.) = 0. Optimality now requires
satisfying the constraints (2.24) and (2.25) and the following conditions:
Uc(t) = µt[Uc(t) + Ucc(t){ct + γAt+1 + g¯ − f(k¯, ht)}] + νt (2.26)
Ul(t) = µt[Ul(t)− Ull(t)ht + Uc(t)fh(k¯, ht)] + νtfh(k¯, ht) (2.27)
µtUc(t)γ + νt(1 + γ) = βνt+1(1 + γ) (2.28)
νt = βνt+1R∗ (2.29)
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where Eq.s (2.26), (2.27) (2.28), and (2.29) are the first order conditions with respect to ct, ht
At+1, and b
g
t+1, respectively.
When the planner weighs the benefits and costs of the banks’ recapitalization program, he
knows that by borrowing from international debt markets, he can secure the funds necessary to
recapitalize the banks, and thereby overcome the need of withdrawing all the required resources
from consumption. The cost of this strategy is, however, that in the future, the repayment of
the debt incurred to recapitalize the banks will require resorting to distortionary labor-income
taxes.
2.4 Quantitative Results
In this section we analyze the quantitative implications of a banking crisis, provide the
post-crisis transition paths and discuss the welfare effects of government intervention in each
of the three considered sources of resources to recapitalize the banks.
2.4.1 Functional Forms and Parameters
To solve the model numerically we assume the following functional forms. The utility
function is separable in consumption and leisure:
U(ct, lt) = ln ct + θ ln lt
and the production function is Cobb Douglas:
yt = Bk¯αh1−αt , α ∈ (0, 1)
The baseline parameter values, which are shown in Table 2.1, are chosen to be representative
of the main macroeconomic and banking conditions in developing countries. The annual net
rate of interest on international debt is set at 5%. The household discount factor is set equal
to 1/R∗, which gives β = 0.9879. The parameter, θ, that determines the share of leisure in
the household utility function, is set to 1.5, so that work effort is approximately 1/3 of the
total time endowment. Following the standard in the literature, the share of physical capital
in production of the final good, α, is set at 1/3. The capital stock, k¯, and the productivity
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parameter, B, are set such that the capital-output ratio, on annual basis, is about 2. The
banking capital to deposit ratio in the loan production function is set at 1/10, i.e., γ = 10,
although we later compare the welfare effects for different values of γ. The fixed component
of government outlays, g¯, is set equal to 2, so that the steady-state government consumption
is equal to about 14% of output, as reported by the United Nations for developing countries4.
The initial steady state level of banking capital, A¯, is calibrated to match an annual net interest
rate on loans of 8.5%, which generates A¯ = 0.9222. One period in the model is interpreted as
one quarter.
2.4.2 Transition Dynamics
The timing of events is as follows: at the beginning of period 0 the economy is in steady
state and at the end of that period the economy is hit by a banking crisis, hence tc = 0+; in
this same time period, the government initiates its optimal bank recapitalization program. In
the empirical literature, a banking crisis is defined as much or all of the banking capital being
exhausted (see for instance Caprio and Klingebiel (2003)). Taking an approximate mid-point,
we discuss the results for a 50% decline in banking capital under the three financing methods.
Figure 2.1 plots the transitional dynamics induced by the banking crisis and the subsequent
government intervention for the three sources of financing discussed above. Given the Leontief
structure of the bank-loan production technology, deposits and bank loans follow the same
path as banking capital. Also, given the fixed physical capital stock, the path of employment
and output are similar.
Consider first the case where the recapitalization is financed by labor-income taxes. In the
first period, which is the period of unraveling of the banking crisis, the low stock of bank capital
constrains the credit that banks can extend to the firms, which in turn reduces employment
and output. Recapitalizing the banks requires a high tax on labor income, which decreases
labor supply via the substitution effect, adding another negative effect on labor and output.
All in all, consumption declines. The maximum amount of banking capital injections occurs
4See, for example, the United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance data on gov-
ernment consumption as a percentage of GDP in developing countries.
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during the first period because the marginal benefit of increasing the stock of banking capital
is at its highest level. As the stock of banking capital increases, the marginal benefit of further
injections declines. From the second period onward, as the amount of injections decline, so
does the tax rate on labor income. Due to the increasing banking capital stock, and hence bank
loans, firms are able to borrow and produce more, so the economy starts recovering from the
recession caused by the banking crisis. Owing to the high resource cost and the distortionary
nature of financing the recapitalization program, the optimal recapitalization path is a gradual
one.
Consider now the case where lump-sum taxes are available; this is equivalent to the gov-
ernment issuing domestic bonds to pay for the recapitalization program and having access to
taxes on the rents accruing to the stocks of capital. On impact, employment, consumption
and output decline as the economy responds to the high interest rate on working-capital loans.
Since the resources for recapitalization are raised using non-distortionary methods, employ-
ment, and hence output, fall less than in the case of distortionary taxes. Although the method
of taxation is non-distortionary, consumption smoothing entails a gradual recapitalization path
due to the large amount of resources involved. Again, the amount of injections decline over
time due to the declining marginal benefit of these injections as the stock of banking capital
increases.
When the government has access to international lending, even if the only taxes available
are distortionary, the optimal recapitalization is undertaken in one shot and, at the same
time, the government is able to smooth consumption completely by borrowing from abroad.
Banking capital, and hence bank loans, reach their new steady state level in period 2, while
consumption and employment (hence output) adjust to their new steady state levels in period
1 itself. Although the banking capital stock, and hence the amount of bank loans, is low and
the firms are working-capital constrained, the government borrows from international debt
markets to subsidize employment in period 1. Due to this, households are willing to supply
labor to the firms even at a low gross wage rate, wt. Hence, even with a low banking capital
stock in period 1, due to the subsidy to labor income, consumption, employment and output
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are at their new steady-state levels.
Table 2.2 reports the steady state levels of banking capital, output and consumption. Given
the real resource cost of increasing the stock of banking capital, optimality dictates that the
marginal cost of financing the bank recapitalization be equated to the marginal benefit of an
extra unit of banking capital. When labor-income taxes finance the recapitalization program,
apart from having large resource costs, these taxes further distort the economy. With access
to lump-sum taxes, the government is able to avoid the distortions caused by the labor-income
taxes, but the resources for recapitalization still need to be financed domestically. Only when
borrowing from international debt markets is allowed, can the government completely spread
out the recapitalization costs over time. Hence, the steady state levels of banking capital,
deposits, loans, employment and output are the highest when there is access to international
debt markets, followed by the case of non-distortionary taxes. However, steady state consump-
tion is the lowest with access to international debt, in spite of employment and output being
the highest: this is because part of the output is used to pay interest on the country’s debt
obligations, which in turn requires the households to work more.
2.4.3 Welfare Effects
We compute a number of measures of the welfare effects of a banking crisis (for the different
sources of financing) to highlight different aspects of the welfare costs of a crisis. In all cases
the no-crisis equilibrium is the benchmark. First, following Lucas (1987), we define the net
welfare effects of a banking crisis, λ1, as the permanent, constant decrease in the no-crisis
steady state consumption, c¯, for t = 0, 1, . . . ,∞, that leaves households indifferent between
the lifetime utility obtained in the no-crisis equilibrium and lifetime utility under the crisis
equilibria, inclusive of the transitional dynamics of consumption, ct, and leisure, lt:
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
ln {(1− λ1)c¯}+ θ ln l¯
]
=
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 [ln ct + θ ln lt] (2.30)
where l¯ is the no-crisis steady state leisure.
While the post-crisis consumption is lower than the no-crisis consumption, the post-crisis
employment is always lower than the pre-crisis level. In computing welfare, this drop in
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employment (increase in leisure) compensates, to some extent, for the lower consumption. To
highlight the effect of lower consumption alone, on welfare, we also compute the above welfare
effects holding leisure fixed at the pre-crisis steady state level. Thus we define the welfare
measure, λ2, as:
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
ln {(1− λ2)c¯}+ θ ln l¯
]
=
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
ln ct + θ ln l¯
]
(2.31)
In all cases, the welfare loss computed using our second measure is higher than the one using
the first measure because in both methods the consumption profile is the same, given the
financing method, but in the second measure employment (leisure) is higher (lower), which
reduces the crisis utility level.
To highlight the fact that the transitional costs of a bank recapitalization program, due
to decline in consumption, are more severe than the lifetime cost of the crisis, we compute
the welfare loss arising purely from the transitional dynamics of the movement to the post-
crisis steady state, under different programs. Note that the times of convergence to the new
steady states, tss, are different for the different financing methods, reflecting the difference
in distortions under different recapitalization programs. We characterize welfare loss as the
equivalent permanent reduction in the no-crisis steady state consumption, defining λ3 such
that:
tss∑
t=1
βt−1
[
ln {(1− λ3)c¯}+ θ ln l¯
]
=
tss∑
t=1
βt−1 [ln ct + θ ln lt] (2.32)
Finally, to characterize the effect of lower consumption alone on welfare, in computing the
welfare loss induced by the transitional dynamics of a bank restructuring program, we hold
leisure fixed at the no-crisis steady state level, and define λ4 to satisfy:
tss∑
t=1
βt−1
[
ln {(1− λ4)c¯}+ θ ln l¯
]
=
tss∑
t=1
βt−1
[
ln ct + θ ln l¯
]
(2.33)
The results for the welfare comparisons are presented in Table 2.3. We discuss these results
for our baseline calibration of a banking capital to deposit ratio of 1/10, i.e., γ = 10, and
we use other values of γ for sensitivity analysis. If the government does not recapitalize the
banking system in the aftermath of a crisis and the banking capital stock stays at the crisis level
infinitely, then the welfare loss is a decline of 5.51% in the no-crisis steady state consumption
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using our first measure and 22.08% using the second measure. Recall that the reason for the
higher value of welfare loss using the second measure is that, while consumption is at the crisis
level, we hold employment (leisure) fixed at the high (low) no-crisis level.
The net welfare loss of a crisis with recapitalization financed by distortionary taxes are
0.65% and 1.42% of the no-crisis consumption using the first and second measures, respectively.
The welfare loss purely due to the transitional dynamics involved in the movement to the new
steady state is 2.69% of the no-crisis consumption, and is higher at 4.46% if employment
(leisure) is held constant at the no-crisis level.
Financing the recapitalization with non-distortionary taxes results in a welfare loss of 0.63%
(1.35%) of the no-crisis consumption using our first (second) measure. The welfare loss is to
the order of 2.74% due to the transitional dynamics alone, and it is 4.35% if we also hold
employment fixed at the no-crisis level.
Access to international debt eases the welfare cost of a banking crisis considerably, and
the welfare loss of a banking crisis is 0.51% of steady state consumption using our first and
third measures, while it is 0.72% using the second and fourth measures. The lifetime and
transition measures coincide in the case of international debt access because the government,
by borrowing from international markets, is able to achieve intertemporal smoothing, and
consumption and employment jump to the new steady state values in period 1 itself, while
banking capital reaches the new steady state in period 2.
Apart from the welfare effects in the benchmark case, we also compute the above welfare
measures for other values of the banking capital to deposit ratio. As shown in Table 2.3, the
welfare losses due to a banking crisis, given the method of financing of the recapitalization
program, is increasing (decreasing) in the banking capital-deposit ratio (γ). Figure 2.2 plots
the welfare costs of banking crises, using measure 1, for different values of γ. As γ increases,
i.e., as the banking capital to deposit ratio in the economy declines, the pre-crisis steady state
banking capital stock declines. This is because, given the other parameters, the amount of
banking capital required to produce the same amount of loans declines. Hence, the welfare loss
due to a crisis, given the recapitalization program, declines because the amount of resources
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required for the recapitalization program decreases with the decline in the initial loss of banking
capital.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Banking sector crises, which have been prevalent in both developing and developed coun-
tries, have presented a stiff challenge to policy makers. Given the public-good aspect of a well
running financial system, governments almost invariably end up bearing the burden of financ-
ing the restructuring programs necessary to recapitalize a bankrupt banking system. The high
fiscal cost of these programs warrants careful analysis of the financing options used by the
government.
In this chapter we undertook a first attempt at examining the public-finance aspect of
the government’s recapitalization of a bankrupt banking sector in a dynamic general equilib-
rium setting. We formulate the Ramsey planner’s problems under three different scenarios:
recapitalizations financed with distortionary taxes, with non-distortionary taxes and by bor-
rowing from international debt markets. The Ramsey problems were solved numerically and
the welfare costs of a banking crisis were found to be substantial.
The post restructuring levels of banking capital are different under the three regimes, re-
flecting the difference in distortions due to the different financing options of the recapitalization
program. It has often been suggested that the government should restructure the banking sys-
tem in one shot, but our analysis of the Ramsey planner’s problems shows that optimality
requires a gradual approach unless the economy can borrow from international markets. This
is because the high resource cost typically involved in a restructuring program should be spread
out over time to minimize the distortions introduced in funding the program. This highlights
the importance of having access to international debt markets during period of financial dis-
tress; furthermore, the results discussed here may also justify why under some circumstances it
might be highly convenient to have international organizations extending emergency financing
to developing countries hit by banking crises. This financing could alleviate the effects of a
banking crisis and avoid a rather painful and long-drawn adjustment process in the post-crisis
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scenario.
We have not considered the moral hazard problems arising from the government interven-
tion in financial markets, nor have we incorporated the different methods used for recapitaliza-
tion5, which can have different effects on the government budget. These issues are important
and present avenues for future research. Another possible avenue for future research is the
explicit modeling of why private agents do not accumulate banking capital, which necessitates
government intervention.
5For details on the latter, see Daniel et al. (1997).
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Table 2.1: Baseline parameter values
Parameters Values
β Discount factor 0.988
θ Leisure share parameter in utility 1.5
B Productivity parameter 6
k¯ Physical capital stock 115
α Capital’s share in output 1/3
γ Ratio of deposits to banking capital 10
g¯ Fixed government consumption 2
R∗ Quarterly world interest rate 1.012
Table 2.2: Steady state values under baseline parameters
Variable Pre-crisis Post-crisis
No intervention Labor tax Lump-sum Tax International Debt
A 0.922 0.461 0.910 0.910 0.918
y 14.118 11.443 14.062 14.063 14.091
c 12.118 9.443 12.062 12.063 12.030
h 0.337 0.246 0.335 0.335 0.336
Notes: The steady state levels of the variables are different for the different programs reflect-
ing the difference in distortions due to the different financing options of the recapitalization
programs. For the time period in which the economy converges to the new steady state,
under different financing methods, see Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Welfare effects of banking crises
(50% decline in banking capital)
γ 1 5 10 15 20
Period of convergence to new steady state (tss)
Labor Tax 44 27 23 23 22
Lump-sum Tax 34 25 22 21 22
International Debt 2 2 2 2 2
Welfare Effects: λi (in percentages)
λ1 3
∑∞
t=1 β
t−1 [ln {(1− λ1)c¯}+ θ ln l¯] = ∑∞t=1 βt−1 [ln ct + θ ln lt]
No Intervention 5.51 5.51 5.51 5.51 5.51
Labor Tax 1.19 0.71 0.65 0.63 0.62
Lump-sum Tax 1.07 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.61
International Debt 0.91 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.49
λ2 3
∑∞
t=1 β
t−1 [ln {(1− λ2)c¯}+ θ ln l¯] = ∑∞t=1 βt−1 [ln ct + θ ln l¯]
No Intervention 22.08 22.08 22.08 22.08 22.08
Labor Tax 3.46 1.65 1.42 1.37 1.30
Lump-sum Tax 2.87 1.53 1.35 1.34 1.26
International Debt 2.06 0.88 0.72 0.67 0.65
λ3 3
∑tss
t=1 β
t−1 [ln {(1− λ3)c¯}+ θ ln l¯] = ∑tsst=1 βt−1 [ln ct + θ ln lt]
Labor Tax 2.81 2.55 2.69 2.61 2.66
Lump-sum Tax 3.08 2.63 2.74 2.79 2.64
International Debt 0.91 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.49
λ4 3
∑tss
t=1 β
t−1 [ln {(1− λ4)c¯}+ θ ln l¯] = ∑tsst=1 βt−1 [ln ct + θ ln l¯]
Labor Tax 6.10 4.46 4.46 4.41 4.32
Lump-sum Tax 5.43 4.25 4.35 4.61 4.18
International Debt 2.06 0.88 0.72 0.67 0.65
Notes: The no-crisis case is the benchmark for these welfare
comparisons. γ is the deposit to banking capital ratio in the
economy; c¯ and l¯ are the no-crisis steady state consumption
and leisure levels; ct and lt are consumption and leisure in the
crisis equilibrium. The measures of the welfare loss of a bank-
ing crisis are defined as the permanent, constant percentage
declines in the no-crisis steady state consumption that leave
households indifferent between the no-crisis equilibrium and
the crisis equilibria, i.e., the λi’s satisfy the respective equa-
tions.
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Figure 2.1: Dynamics in the aftermath of a banking crisis under the three recapitalization
programs.
Notes: A banking crisis, that erodes 50% of the banking capital stock, occurs in period 0;
from period 1, the government initiates its optimal recapitalization program. All values in the
above graphs are % deviations from the pre-crisis steady state.
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Figure 2.2: Welfare costs of banking crises.
Notes: The no-crisis equilibrium is the benchmark for these welfare costs. All values in the
graph are for welfare measure 1 where λ1 is the permanent, constant percentage decrease in the
no-crisis steady state consumption, c¯, given the no-crisis leisure (l¯), for t = 0, 1, . . . ,∞, that
leaves households indifferent between the lifetime utility obtained in the no-crisis equilibrium
and lifetime utility under the crisis equilibria, inclusive of the transitional dynamics of con-
sumption, ct, and leisure, lt, i.e.,
∑∞
t=1 β
t−1 [ln {(1− λ1)c¯}+ θ ln l¯] = ∑∞t=1 βt−1 [ln ct + θ ln lt].
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CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER
FREE TRADE WITH TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
(This chapter is a close version of Sikdar and Lapan (2007).)
3.1 Introduction
A serious concern about the relationship between trade and environmental policy is that
these two issues have usually been dealt with separately in real-world bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements. When trade agreements forbid the use of trade policies to pursue terms of
trade goals, governments may use domestic environmental policies as a second best method
of pursuing their terms of trade objectives. Other reasons that might motivate the distortion
of domestic environmental policies are the competition to attract more industries (capital)
from countries with stricter policies and to capture rents from foreign firms in the presence of
imperfect competition. While prior research has shown that when there are no transbound-
ary externalities negotiating tariffs, in conjunction with commitments to market access, can
lead to efficiency (see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (2001)), efficiency will not result from
trade agreements alone when there are transboundary externalities. In this chapter we explore
the effects of trade liberalization on environmental outcomes and welfare, in the presence of
transboundary pollution, when environmental policy is set non-cooperatively.
The literature on trade and environmental policy in the presence of an international spillover
of emissions is too vast to be adequately surveyed here. Some papers assume the pollution
externality affects firm productivity, whereas other papers assume the externality hurts house-
holds (an “eyesore” externality). Papers also differ in terms of the policy tools allowed (do-
mestic policies, border policies, or both), the number of policy active countries, and in terms of
country size. Since we investigate how, in the presence of an eyesore transboundary externality,
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the movement from autarky to free trade affects domestic policy and welfare, our literature
review focuses on papers with similar structures.
Markusen (1975), one of the first papers to address transboundary pollution, considers one
policy active country that uses both tariffs and domestic policy to influence the terms of trade
and global pollution output. Rauscher (1997) derives the optimal environmental tax under
free trade for a large country that suffers from transboundary pollution. He finds that “carbon
leakage” occurs if stricter domestic environmental policy leads to increases in foreign emissions
and concludes that with “substantial leakage effects, optimal environmental policies tend to
lead to too low emission tax rates” when the pure terms of trade effects are small compared
to leakage effects. However, he considers the case in which only one country is policy active.
Copeland (1996) considers a small country (A) which suffers transboundary pollution from
production of its import good in a neighboring economy (B). Since both countries are small
and there are transportation costs between the ROW and these two countries, import tariffs
in A will not affect production in B, provided B exports to ROW. However, an import tariff
on pollution content can change the way in which B produces output, and hence can reduce
the amount of transboundary pollution1.
Ludema and Wooton (1994) consider strategic policy in a two country asymmetric trade
model with transboundary pollution. Foreign production, which is exported to the home
country, generates eyesore pollution that affects only the home country. Under a free trade
agreement the foreign country, which is not affected by the pollution, implements environmental
policies to manipulate its terms of trade, while the home country uses process standards2 to
improve its terms of trade and restrict the incidence of transboundary pollution.
Copeland and Taylor (1995) study a Heckscher-Ohlin two factor model in which eyesore
pollution is one of two primary inputs. Assuming pollution is a pure global public good
and that there is free trade, they evaluate the welfare implications of trade when countries
non-cooperatively choose their environmental policy, pollution permits. They find that, as
1If foreign output and pollution were in a one-to-one correspondence, then the tariff on imports and tariff
on pollution content would be identical.
2As the authors themselves note, such standards would be in violation of WTO rules, so we are not sure if
such policies would be viable under free trade.
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compared to autarky, emissions in the South rise and emissions in the North fall; aggregate
world pollution rises if trade does not lead to factor price equalization (FPE), while under
FPE aggregate world pollution is unaffected by trade. Allowing free trade in pollution permits
across countries guarantees FPE and hence eliminates the possibility that global emissions
increase. While most of the paper assumes countries ignore the effect of their policies on world
prices3, even when countries take into account this effect, the equilibrium coincides with the
earlier case because of the pure global public good nature of pollution. We derive a similar
result in our model, as a special case, in Section 3.5.3.
Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003) consider strategic interactions between two closed
economies with respect to environmental policies. Emissions (a by-product of production)
cause global warming that reduces welfare in both countries. They find emission taxes and
quotas are equivalent, while emission standards lead to over-production of the polluting good.
Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006) compare these policy instruments under free trade, but they use a
non-strategic setting in which only one country uses environmental policy. Kiyono and Ishikawa
(2004) specify a partial equilibrium model in which two large countries import fuel, an input in
the production of a final good. Emissions, a by-product of the use of fuel in production, add to
global pollution, which reduces welfare in both importing countries. Regulation of emissions
only by the home country leads to carbon leakage, as changes in the world price of fuel affect
pollution emissions in the other country. Because of strategic effects, they find world pollution
is lower when both countries use quotas, rather then taxes, to regulate emissions. In their
model the terms of trade and the carbon leakage effect reinforce each other. In general, if
these motives work in different directions in any one country, then it is not possible to infer
the net effect on pollution and welfare. In our open economy model, with no terms of trade
effects in equilibrium, it is purely the carbon leakage effect that drive the results.
We use a two good, two country trade model to analyze the effects of liberalizing trade
while leaving domestic policy unconstrained in the presence of transboundary pollution. We
assume production of good (X) in either country generates eyesore pollution which reduces
3In essence, they assume there are a large number of Northern and a large number of Southern countries.
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welfare in both countries. There are three potential distortions in our model: first, there is a
production distortion, a domestic externality that drives a wedge between the private and social
costs in one sector. Second, countries are large and hence have incentives to manipulate their
terms of trade and lastly, the presence of transboundary pollution implies an efficient allocation
cannot be achieved when countries practice free trade but set domestic environmental policies
non-cooperatively.
Within this framework we compare the effects of environmental taxes and quotas when
countries set policy non-cooperatively. We find that, if governments use taxes, the movement
from autarky to free trade can result in an equilibrium in which both countries use lower taxes
and achieve lower welfare than under autarky. This race to the bottom occurs not because
of the terms of trade effect (as there is no trade in equilibrium), but rather because - in a
strategic setting in an open economy - the government relaxes environmental taxes to reduce
the incidence of transboundary pollution from abroad (i.e., to reduce “carbon leakage” in the
free trade equilibrium). This race to the bottom does not occur when (globally nontradable)
emission quotas, rather then taxes, are used. However, if international trade in emission
permits is allowed, then a race to the bottom will occur if pollution is not a pure global
public bad4. Thus, we find that in the symmetric free trade equilibrium, pollution is lowest
with internationally nontradable quotas and the internationally nontradable emissions quota
equilibrium is strictly welfare-superior to the emissions tax equilibrium. The internationally
tradable quota equilibrium strictly welfare dominates the tax equilibrium only a under certain
condition if pollution is not a pure global public bad; however, the former strictly welfare
dominates the latter if pollution is a pure global public bad.
We generalize the model to allow for the case when emissions and production are not
necessarily in one-to-correspondence. This model allows for the possibility of polluting and
non-polluting inputs and also nests the case of the production of both goods emitting pollution
as a by-product. In this generalized framework we find that the results found earlier in the
chapter continue to hold.
4If the marginal damage in the home country from foreign emissions is positive, but less than that from
domestic emissions, then there is transboundary pollution but it is not a pure global public bad.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 3.2 and
Section 3.3 derives the autarky equilibrium. Section 3.4 looks at the efficient equilibrium, while
Section 3.5 explores the strategic free trade equilibrium, and compares pollution and welfare
under different policy instruments. In Section 3.6 we present a generalization of the model and
Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 The Model
We conduct our analysis using a standard two good (X,Y ) model of trade between two
countries, a home country and a foreign country (denoted by *). The production possibility
frontier of the home country is
g(x, y) ≥ 0; gi < 0, i = x, y (3.1)
The foreign production possibility frontier is similar. Emissions are a by-product of the pro-
duction of X; good Y does not pollute. We assume that production of one unit of X generates
θ units of emissions in the country of production and, due to transboundary pollution, θˆ units
of emissions in the other country. Thus, total pollution in the home and foreign countries are,
respectively,
Z = θx+ θˆx∗, Z∗ = θˆx+ θx∗; θˆ ∈ (0, θ] (3.2)
When θ > θˆ, domestic emissions cause a higher marginal damage in the home country than
foreign emissions, while pollution is a pure global public bad if θ = θˆ.
Let cx and cy denote consumption of X and Y in the home country. Preferences of the
representative agent in the home country are given by a twice differentiable concave utility
function
U(cx, cy, Z) = φ(cx, cy)− ηZ; φcx , φcy , η > 0 (3.3)
Foreign country preferences are similar.
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3.3 Autarky
We first solve the domestic social planner’s problem. Assuming home and foreign actions
are taken simultaneously, the benevolent home government maximizes its own citizen’s welfare,
which yields the following optimality condition (since in autarky x = cx and y = cy)
gx
gy
=
φcx − ηθ
φcy
(3.4)
i.e., the domestic rate of transformation equals the social marginal rate of substitution, taking
into account the effect of emissions on domestic welfare. However, private agents in the econ-
omy do not take into account the domestic distortion in their decision making process. Profit
maximization implies
pfx
pfy
=
gx
gy
(3.5)
where pfx and p
f
y are the producer prices of X and Y respectively. Producers equate the
domestic rate of transformation to the producer price ratio. Utility maximization by consumers
leads to the following optimality condition
pcx
pcy
=
φcx
φcy
(3.6)
where pcx and p
c
y are the consumer prices of X and Y respectively. Consumers equate the
marginal rate of substitution to the consumer price ratio. Comparing the optimality conditions
of the social planner, producers and consumers, Eq.s (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) respectively, it is
clear that the best solution is a tax on domestic emissions
taz =
η
φcy
(3.7)
i.e., a tax on emissions equal to the domestic marginal damage of emissions. Given the one-
to-one correspondence between output and emissions, this emission tax is equivalent to a tax
on the output of X, which in our case is
ta =
ηθ
φcy
(3.8)
Note that this autarky solution is inefficient from the global perspective as governments do
not internalize the transboundary effect of their emissions.
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3.4 Efficient Equilibrium
To obtain Pareto efficient allocations we solve a social planner’s problem that maximizes the
welfare of the home country subject to meeting a certain utility target for the foreign country.
Naturally, the social planner accounts for the domestic and transboundary externalities. The
social planner’s problem yields the following optimality conditions
φcx
φcy
=
φc∗x
φc∗y
(3.9)
gx
gy
=
φcx
φcy
−
[
ηθ
φcy
+
ηθˆ
φc∗y
]
(3.10)
gx∗
gy∗
=
φc∗x
φc∗y
−
[
ηθˆ
φcy
+
ηθ
φc∗y
]
(3.11)
The marginal rate of substitution is equated across countries and the domestic rate of trans-
formation in each country is equated to the social marginal rate of substitution, taking into
account the effect of emissions on both countries. Hence, the Pareto efficient tax on emissions
is
tez =
[
η
φcy
+
η
φc∗y
]
; te∗z =
[
η
φc∗y
+
η
φcy
]
(3.12)
i.e., a tax equal to the sum of marginal damages in the two countries. This tax is equivalent
to a tax on the production of the polluting good, X
te =
[
ηθ
φcy
+
ηθˆ
φc∗y
]
; te∗ =
[
ηθ
φc∗y
+
ηθˆ
φcy
]
(3.13)
Hence, efficiency need not require equalization of environmental taxes across countries, but it
does require that both countries internalize the domestic and transboundary effects of emis-
sions5.
3.5 Free Trade
In this section we analyze the effects of a movement from autarky to free trade and how
the choice of the policy instrument governs these effects. We consider each country’s optimal
5If θ > θˆ, then te > te∗ if, and only if, φc∗y > φcy .
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non-cooperative environmental policy, given that they have committed to free trade6 and that
they act simultaneously. We consider three cases: i) governments regulate emissions using
a tax on domestic emissions (equivalent to a tax on the production of X), ii) emission (or
production) quotas are used to regulate pollution, and these quotas are not tradable across
countries, and iii) internationally tradable quotas are the environmental policy instruments.
Finally, we compare pollution and welfare under these different instruments.
3.5.1 Taxes
The only policy instrument available to each country is a tax on emissions. Given the
one-to-one correspondence between output and emissions, this is equivalent to a tax on the
production of X, denoted by t and t∗, and we carry out our analysis in the rest of this section
using equivalent production policies. Let px and py be the (world) consumer prices of X and
Y respectively. Let good Y be the numeraire, hence we set py ≡ 1. The GNP functions for
the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
R(px − t); R∗(px − t∗)
The expenditure functions for the home country and the foreign country are7
e(px, u+ η{θx+ θˆx∗}); e∗(px, u∗ + η{θˆx+ θx∗})
Equilibrium is described by the income constraints (balance of trade constraints) for the
two countries and a market clearing condition:
e(px, u+ η{θx+ θˆx∗}) = R(px − t) + tx (3.14)
e∗(px, u∗ + η{θˆx+ θx∗}) = R∗(px − t∗) + t∗x∗ (3.15)
epx + e
∗
px = x+ x
∗ (3.16a)
x = Rpx−t (3.16b)
6This can be due to trade agreements that restrict the use of trade policies.
7Due to the presence of the externality, the expenditure function is given by: mincx,cy (pxcx +
cy) s.t. φ(cx, cy)− ηZ ≥ u⇒ mincx,cy (pxcx + cy) s.t. φ(cx, cy) ≥ u+ ηZ.
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x∗ = R∗px−t∗ (3.16c)
where Eq.s (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) are the resource constraints for the home and foreign
countries, and the market clearing condition, respectively. We assume that governments si-
multaneously and non-cooperatively choose their domestic tax to maximize welfare. Also, all
tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum to consumers.
Taking the total differential of Eq.s (3.14) and (3.16b), and combining we have
eudu+ (euηθ − t)dx+ euηθˆdx∗ = (Rp − epx)dpx; dx = S′(dpx − dt) (3.17)
where we define Rpx−t as Rp, and Rpp as S′. Similarly totally differentiating Eq.s (3.15) and
(3.16b), we have
e∗u∗du
∗ + (e∗u∗ηθ − t∗)dx∗ + e∗u∗ηθˆdx = (R∗p∗ − e∗px)dpx; dx∗ = S∗
′
(dpx − dt∗) (3.18)
where we define R∗px−t∗ as R
∗
p∗ , and R
∗
p∗p∗ as S
∗′ .
Differentiating Eq. (3.14) with respect to t we get the home country’s best response function
as a function of the foreign country’s tax
eu
du
dt
= (Rp − epx)
dpx
dt
+ (t− euηθ)dx
dt
− euηθˆ dx
∗
dt
(3.19)
The first term, the terms of trade effect, depends on whether the country is a net importer
of X. The second term is the effect of changes in t on domestic pollution: as t increases,
domestic emissions decline. An increase in the domestic environmental tax reduces domestic
production of the polluting good resulting, under trade, in an increase in px, which increases
foreign production and emissions. Thus, the last term is the transboundary pollution effect
and reflects the role of carbon leakage.
Similarly the best response function of the foreign country is given by
e∗u∗
du∗
dt∗
= (R∗p∗ − e∗px)
dpx
dt∗
+ (t∗ − e∗u∗ηθ)
dx∗
dt∗
− e∗u∗ηθˆ
dx
dt∗
(3.20)
Note that Eq.s (3.19) and (3.20) can also be solved for the optimal autarky production taxes.
In autarky domestic production equals domestic consumption, i.e., Rp(.) = epx(.), and foreign
output is independent of domestic policy, i.e., dx
∗
dt = 0; hence, from Eq. (3.19) we have
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eu
du
dt = (t− euηθ)dxdt . Since dxdt < 0 and eu > 0, it follows that the optimal autarky tax for the
home country is
ta = euηθ (3.21)
Similarly the optimal autarky tax in the foreign country is
ta∗ = e∗uηθ (3.22)
However, with free trade both x and x∗ are affected by the environmental policy in the
other country. Totally differentiating Eq. (3.16) yields, after simplification:
epxudu+ e
∗
pxu∗du
∗ + [(β + β∗) + S′(epxuηθ + e
∗
pxu∗ηθˆ) + S
∗′(epxuθˆη + e
∗
pxu∗ηθ)]dpx
= [S′(epxuηθ + e
∗
pxu∗ηθˆ)− S′]dt+ [S∗
′
(epxuηθˆ + e
∗
pxu∗ηθ)− S∗
′
]dt∗ (3.23)
where we define β ≡ epxpx − S′ < 0 and β∗ ≡ e∗pxpx − S∗
′
< 0.
Eq.s (3.17), (3.18) and (3.23) can be written in matrix form as
eu 0 S′(euθη − t) + S∗′euηθˆ +Mx
0 e∗u S∗
′
(e∗u∗ηθ − t∗) + S′e∗u∗ηθˆ +M∗x
epxu e
∗
pxu∗ (β + β
∗) + S′(epxuηθ + e∗pxu∗ηθˆ) + S
∗′(epxuθˆη + e∗pxu∗ηθ)


du
du∗
dpx

=

S′(euηθ − t)dt+ S∗′euηθˆdt∗
S∗′(e∗u∗ηθ − t∗)dt∗ + S′e∗u∗ηθˆdt
[S′(epxuηθ + e∗pxu∗ηθˆ)− S′]dt+ [S∗
′
(epxuηθˆ + e∗pxu∗ηθ)− S∗
′
]dt∗
 (3.24)
where Mx = epx−Rp is the imports of the home country. In equilibrium we have Mx+M∗x = 0.
The above system can be inverted and solved. However, to simplify the calculations, we assume
quasi-linear preferences (so that the income effect on demand for X is zero, i.e., epxu = e∗pxu∗ =
0) in the rest of the chapter. Hence, from the third equation in the above system we have
dpx
dt
= − S
′
β + β∗
> 0
Substituting this into the first equation in the above system we have
du
dt
=
1
eu
S′(euηθ − t) + 1
eu
[
S′(euηθ − t) + S∗′euηθˆ +Mx
] [ S′
β + β∗
]
(3.25)
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Note that our model nests the case of no externality, i.e., when η = 0, and also the case
of no transboundary pollution, i.e., θˆ = 0. In the case of no externality, the sign of the
above expression depends on Mx. If the country is an importer of X, then Mx > 0 implying(
du
dt
)
t=0
< 0. Thus the standard terms of trade argument applies, whereby a large country
should subsidize domestic production of the importable if the use of commercial policies is
prohibited.
Now suppose that the home and foreign countries are identical. Hence, if t = t∗ then
Mx = 0. Evaluating Eq. (3.25) at the autarky solution, ta = euηθ, we have(
du
dt
)
t=ta
= S∗
′
ηθˆ
[
S′
β + β∗
]
< 0 (3.26)
Intuitively, the result in Eq. (3.26) follows because increases in domestic taxes increase foreign
output and hence foreign pollution, i.e., dx
∗
dt > 0. Thus, the transboundary pollution effect, in
our symmetric model, leads to lower environmental taxes for both countries under free trade.
We summarize our results in the following proposition
Proposition 1. If two countries have identical preferences and technology, and ta is the op-
timal autarky tax in each country, then under free trade each country’s optimal response is to
choose a tax rate less than ta.
This policy is optimal for both countries. Hence, assuming identical solutions and unique-
ness, we have
Proposition 2. With identical countries, if countries set environmental taxes non-cooperatively
but otherwise pursue free trade, then
1. there is a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, and
2. both countries are worse off under free trade relative to autarky.
Note that even if the countries are not identical, by continuity, if they are sufficiently similar
then the above results hold. Thus,
Corollary 1. If countries are sufficiently similar then a move from autarky to free trade will
make both countries worse off if environmental taxes are set non-cooperatively.
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An important implication of this is that the more similar countries are, the more likely it
is that trade liberalization will lead to lower welfare in both countries. The primary role of
environmental policies should be regulation of pollution. However, in the absence of tariffs
large countries have an incentive to use environmental policies as a secondary trade barrier
to manipulate the terms of trade. There is another role for environmental policies in the
presence of transboundary pollution; change in world prices due to domestic environmental
regulations can increase foreign emissions via carbon leakage, which reduces the benefits from
tighter domestic policies. The motive behind the under-regulation of the polluting sector is
to reduce transboundary pollution from abroad, which partly offsets the benefits of tighter
domestic pollution policies. In equilibrium, in our symmetric model, there is no terms of trade
motive; it is purely the transboundary pollution effect, i.e., the incentive to reduce carbon
leakage, that leads countries to lower domestic environmental tax, resulting in a race to the
bottom in environmental taxes.
3.5.2 Quotas
Now suppose both governments use command and control policies, such as upper bounds
on emissions (or output), instead of taxes. Hence x ≤ L and x∗ ≤ L∗, where L and L∗ are the
production limits in the home and foreign countries, respectively. Governments simultaneously
and non-cooperatively choose their quota levels to maximize welfare. Define the (shadow) value
of a quota in the home and foreign countries as τˆ ≡ px−p and τˆ∗ ≡ px−p∗, respectively, where
p (p∗) is the producer price of X in the home (foreign) country. If the quotas are auctioned
off or traded domestically then τˆ and τˆ∗ are the market prices of the quotas in the home and
foreign countries, respectively. The home and foreign GNP functions are, respectively,
R(px − τˆ), with Rp(px − τˆ) ≡ L; R∗(px − τˆ∗), with R∗p∗(px − τˆ∗) ≡ L∗
Equilibrium is described by
e(px, u+ η{θx+ θˆx∗}) = R(px − τˆ) + τˆL (3.27)
e∗(px, u∗ + η{θˆx+ θx∗}) = R∗(px − τˆ∗) + τˆ∗L∗ (3.28)
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epx + e
∗
px = x+ x
∗ (3.29a)
x = Rpx−τˆ ≤ L (3.29b)
x∗ = R∗px−τˆ∗ ≤ L∗ (3.29c)
where Eq.s (3.27), (3.28) and (3.29) are the income constraints for the home and foreign
countries, and the market clearing conditions, respectively. The quota rents (revenues) are
rebated lump-sum to consumers. We assume that the quotas bind; hence, τˆ , τˆ∗ > 0, and Eq.s
(3.29b) and (3.29c) hold with equality.
Taking the total differential of Eq. (3.27) we have
epxdpx + eudu+ euηθdx+ euηθˆdx
∗ = Rp(dpx − dτˆ) + Ldτˆ + τˆ dL;
dx = dL, and Rp(px − τˆ) = L (3.30)
Similarly totally differentiating Eq. (3.28) we have
e∗pxdpx + e
∗
u∗du
∗ + e∗u∗ηθdx
∗ + e∗u∗ηθˆdx = R
∗
p∗(dpx − dτˆ∗) + L∗dτˆ∗ + τˆ∗dL∗;
dx∗ = dL∗, and R∗p∗(px − τˆ∗) = L∗ (3.31)
Differentiating Eq. (3.27) with respect to L gives the home country’s best response function
as a function of the foreign country’s quota
eu
du
dL
= (Rp − epx)
dpx
dL
+ (τˆ − euηθ) dx
dL
− euηθˆ dx
∗
dL
(3.32)
The first and second terms are the terms of trade and domestic pollution effects, respectively,
while the last term is the effect of changes in the incidence of transboundary pollution on
domestic welfare. The terms of trade effect depends on whether the polluting good is an
import of the home country. Issuing an additional permit, given that the quota binds, increases
domestic production and domestic emissions. If foreign production changes following changes in
domestic quotas, then it affects domestic welfare via a change in the incidence of transboundary
pollution.
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The foreign country’s best response function is given by
e∗u∗
du∗
dL∗
= (R∗p∗ − e∗px)
dpx
dL∗
+ (τˆ∗ − e∗u∗ηθ)
dx∗
dL∗
− e∗u∗ηθˆ
dx
dL∗
(3.33)
Eq.s (3.32) and (3.33) can be solved for the optimal autarky production quotas. In autarky
domestic consumption equals domestic production and the quota binds, i.e., epx(.) = Rp(.) = L,
and foreign output is independent of domestic policy, i.e., dx
∗
dL = 0; hence, from Eq. (3.30), we
have eu dudL = τˆ − euηθ. Since eu > 0, the domestic production tax equivalent of the optimal
autarky production quota for the home country is
τˆa = euηθ (3.34)
Similarly, the production tax equivalent of the optimal autarky output quota for the foreign
country is
τˆa∗ = e∗u∗ηθ (3.35)
Now consider each country’s optimal non-cooperative environmental policy, given a com-
mitment to free trade. Let xa and xa∗ be the autarky output (quota) levels in the home and
foreign countries, respectively. Further, suppose that the countries are identical. Hence, if
τˆ , τˆ∗ > 0, L = xa = xa∗ = L∗, then ∃N(xa) such that, for L ∈ N [xa], L∗ binds. Hence(
dx∗
dL
)
L=xa
= 0 (3.36)
If L∗ = xa∗ = xa = L, then at L = xa, x(L,L∗) = xa = epx , i.e., L = Rp(.) = epx(.).
Evaluating Eq. (3.32) at the autarky solution, L = xa, we have(
du
dL
)
L=xa
= 0 (3.37)
Hence, for our symmetric specification, the optimal domestic output and the equivalent output
tax are the same in the free trade equilibrium as in the autarky equilibrium. We summarize
our result in the following proposition
Proposition 3. Suppose governments use pollution (or production) limits, rather than taxes
to regulate pollution. Then, in the symmetric equilibrium, the autarky and free trade equilibria
will be the same and there is no race to the bottom in environmental policy.
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To see why this result follows, suppose the foreign government imposes an upper bound on
emissions (output) equal to the autarky level, i.e., it regulates output such that x∗ ≤ L∗ = xa∗ .
For any domestic output x < xa, the reduced world output of good x (compared to the autarky
situation) results in higher consumer (hence, producer) prices than in the (symmetric) autarky
equilibrium and so the foreign output upper bound will bind. As the home country increases
its permissible output limit, L, in the domain L < xa, the foreign production limit continues
to bind and thus dx
∗
dL = 0 in the domain L < x
a. Furthermore, at L = xa, a (small) increase
in L leads to a (small) decline in world consumer prices (to below autarkic levels) but foreign
output is still not affected because the consumer price is above the producer price8. Hence, in
the neighborhood of L = xa, we have dx
∗
dL = 0, i.e., changes in the domestic quota level do not
affect foreign output (hence, foreign emissions). Recall that the driving force behind the race
to the bottom in taxes was the motive to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution.
Since changes in domestic policy do not influence foreign emissions, countries follow the same
policies as in autarky. Thus, although typically there is a presumption that price-based policies
are superior to command and control policies, in a strategic setting that need not be the case,
and the equivalence between the two in closed economies breaks down with the possibility of
trade between countries.
3.5.3 Tradable Quotas
We analyze the interaction between goods trade and permit trade, and consider the situa-
tion in which governments regulate emissions using quotas but, following Copeland and Taylor
(1995), these quotas are tradable across the countries, i.e., countries practice free trade not
only in goods, but also in permits. Thus, producer prices of goods and market values of quotas
are equalized across countries, i.e., p = p∗ = px − τ , where τ is the market price of production
quotas. Governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose quota limits to maximize
8The market value of the foreign production quota, if tradable, will fall but remain positive, as the increase
in domestic output of x lowers the gap between the demand and supply price. However, this has no impact on
the home economy and, due to symmetry, the terms of trade effect around L = xa are zero.
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welfare. Equilibrium is now described by
e(px, u+ η{θx+ θˆx∗}) = R(px − τ) + τL (3.38)
e∗(px, u∗ + η{θˆx+ θx∗}) = R∗(px − τ) + τL∗ (3.39)
epx + e
∗
px = x+ x
∗ (3.40a)
x+ x∗ = Rpx−τ +R
∗
px−τ ≤ L+ L∗ (3.40b)
where Eq.s (3.38), (3.39) and (3.40) are the balance of trade constraints for the home and
foreign countries, and the market clearing conditions, respectively. We assume that the quotas
bind; hence, τ > 0 and
epx + e
∗
px = Rpx−τ +R
∗
px−τ = L+ L
∗ (3.41)
Note that, as shown in the previous section, the production tax equivalent of the optimal
autarky quota in the home and foreign countries are, respectively, τa = euηθ and τa∗ = e∗u∗ηθ.
Taking the total differential of Eq. (3.38) we have
epxdpx + eudu+ euηθdx+ euηθˆdx
∗ = Rp(dpx − dτ) + Ldτ + τdL;
dx+ dx∗ = dL+ dL∗, and Rp(px − τ) +R∗p(px − τ) = L+ L∗ (3.42)
Totally differentiating Eq. (3.39) we get
e∗pxdpx + e
∗
u∗du
∗ + e∗u∗ηθdx
∗ + e∗u∗ηθˆdx = R
∗
p(dpx − dτ) + L∗dτ + τdL∗;
dx+ dx∗ = dL+ dL∗, and Rp(px − τ) +R∗p(px − τ) = L+ L∗ (3.43)
The best response function of the home country in terms of the foreign country’s quota is
derived by differentiating Eq. (3.38) with respect to L
eu
du
dL
= (Rp − epx)
dpx
dL
+ (L−Rp) dτ
dL
+ (τ − euηθ) dx
dL
+ (τ − euηθˆ)dx
∗
dL
(3.44)
The net domestic welfare effect of issuing an additional quota depends on a number of different
effects. The first term, the terms of trade effect, depends on the pattern of trade, while the
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second term is the quota revenue effect. The third term is the effect on domestic welfare
through changes in domestic emissions: if some of the new quotas are used domestically, then
domestic emissions increase. The last term, the transboundary pollution effect, depends on
whether foreign production increases with an increase in domestic quotas and on the public
bad characteristic of pollution.
The foreign country’s best response function is
e∗u∗
du∗
dL∗
= (R∗p − e∗px)
dpx
dL∗
+ (L∗ −R∗p)
dτ
dL∗
+ (τ − e∗u∗ηθ)
dx∗
dL∗
+ (τ − e∗u∗ηθˆ)
dx
dL∗
(3.45)
Differentiating Eq. (3.41) with respect to L we have9
dpx
dL
=
dpx
dL∗
=
1
epxpx + e∗pxpx
< 0 (3.46)
and
dpx
dL
− dτ
dL
=
1
S′ + S∗′
(3.47)
Furthermore, x∗ = R∗p(px − τ) implies (using Eq. (3.47))
dx∗
dL
= S∗
′
(
dpx
dL
− dτ
dL
) =
S∗′
S′ + S∗′
∈ (0, 1) (3.48)
Suppose, as before, that the countries are identical; hence, if L = xa = xa∗ = L∗, then
epx(.) = Rp(.) = L. Evaluating Eq. (3.44) at the autarky solution, L = xa, we have(
eu
du
dL
)
L=xa
=
(
τa − euηθˆ
) dx∗
dL
(3.49)
(τa − euηθˆ) > 0 if θ > θˆ, and Eq. (3.48) ⇒ dx∗dL > 0; thus, Eq. (3.49) implies (since eu > 0)(
du
dL
)
L=xa
> 0 if θ > θˆ (3.50)
We summarize our result in the following proposition
Proposition 4. If two countries have identical preferences and technology, and if domestic
emissions result in a higher marginal damage than transboundary pollution, i.e., if θ > θˆ, then
under free trade in both goods and emission (or production) permits, each country’s optimal
response is to choose a quota level higher than the equilibrium autarky level, La.
9Recall that we assume quasi-linear preferences, so epxu = e
∗
pxu∗ = 0.
47
As this policy is optimal for both countries, assuming identical solutions and uniqueness,
we have the following
Proposition 5. With identical countries, if the marginal damage from domestic emissions is
higher than that from transboundary pollution, i.e., if θ > θˆ, and countries set production (or
emission) quotas non-cooperatively but otherwise pursue free trade in goods and permits, then
1. there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy, and
2. both countries are worse off under free trade relative to autarky.
If the countries are not identical, as long as they are sufficiently similar, then, by continuity,
the above results hold.
Corollary 2. If countries are sufficiently similar and emission (or production) quotas are set
non-cooperatively, then a move from autarky to free trade in both goods and quotas will make
both countries worse off if the marginal damage from domestic emissions is higher than that
from transboundary pollution, i.e., if θ > θˆ.
Thus, the more similar countries are, the more likely it is that both countries will relax
their environmental policies and both will lose from trade liberalization, if θ > θˆ. Note that
with identical countries, assuming identical and unique solutions, Eq. (3.49) implies(
du
dL
)
L=xa
= 0 if θˆ = θ (3.51)
Thus, we have
Proposition 6. If pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if θ = θˆ, then, in the symmetric
equilibrium of this model, the free trade equilibrium with tradable permits is the same as the
autarky and nontradable permit equilibria and there is no race to the bottom in environmental
policy.
Proposition 6 reflects the result in Copeland and Taylor (1995) where, due to the pure
global public bad nature of pollution, the strategic and non-strategic free trade equilibria
coincide. In autarky, issuing an additional permit results in an accompanying increase in
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pollution by θ units, given that the quota binds. However, with free trade in goods and
permits, issuing an additional quota leads to a less than proportional increase in domestic
production as some of the additional quotas are used in the foreign country; now pollution
increases by θ − S∗
′
S′+S∗′
(θ − θˆ) < θ if θ > θˆ. This leads to a race to the bottom in pollution
policies. However, if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if θˆ = θ, the source of emissions
does not matter as the marginal damage is the same irrespective of the origin of pollution.
Hence, there is no incentive to shift emissions to the other country and there is no race to the
bottom.
In Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003) countries, by assumption, do not trade and taxes and
quotas are found to be equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in open economies,
even if there is no trade in equilibrium, due to carbon leakage and the strategic interaction
among countries. This highlights how results that hold in a closed economy setting do not nec-
essarily hold in an open economy setting even if there is no trade in equilibrium. Furthermore,
in our model the only driving force is the carbon leakage effect. In previous models, including
Kiyono and Ishikawa (2004), there have been other motives at play in equilibrium, but we have
isolated the pure effects of carbon leakage and how the choice of policy instrument affects the
outcome of a strategic game.
3.5.4 Pollution and Welfare
In this section we derive the optimal (equivalent) taxes and compare welfare under different
policy instruments. The optimal production tax under autarky is ta = euηθ, while the Pareto
efficient tax is
te = euηθ + e∗u∗ηθˆ > t
a (3.52)
In autarky taxes and quotas are equivalent, i.e.,
ta = τˆa = τa = euηθ (3.53)
Hence, we have
Proposition 7. Under autarky the choice of policy instrument to regulate pollution does not
matter, i.e., environmental taxes and quotas are equivalent.
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This result is similar to Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003), who find that in closed
economies, emission taxes and quotas are equivalent. When the policy instrument is an envi-
ronmental tax, the optimal production tax for the home country can be calculated using Eq.
(3.25). Setting dudt = 0, we have the optimal free trade production tax
t = euηθ +
S∗′euηθˆ +Mx
epxpx + β∗
As before, assuming identical countries, and identical and unique solutions, we have Mx = 0
and
t = euηθ +
S∗′euηθˆ
epxpx + β∗
< ta (3.54)
With internationally nontradable permits, assuming identical countries, the autarky and
free trade equilibria coincide, and the production tax equivalent of the optimal free trade quota
is
τˆ = euηθ = ta (3.55)
Finally, with internationally tradable permits, the production tax equivalent of the optimal
free trade quota can be found by equating dudL to zero in Eq. (3.44)
τ = euηθ +
epx −Rp
epxpx + e∗pxpx
+
(L−Rp)(β + β∗)
(epxpx + e∗pxpx)(S′ + S∗
′)
+
S∗′
S′ + S∗′
(euηθˆ − euηθ)
Again, assuming identical countries, and identical and unique solutions, we have epx(.) =
Rp(.) = L, which implies that the production tax equivalent of the optimal free trade quota is
τ = euηθ +
S∗′
S′ + S∗′
(euηθˆ − euηθ) (3.56)
If θ > θˆ, i.e., if pollution is not a pure global public bad, then τ < ta, while τ = ta if θ = θˆ.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that τ > (<) t if θ
θˆ
< (>) 1− S′+S∗
′
epxpx+β
∗ .
The optimal (equivalent) environmental taxes in the different cases are related as follows
te > ta = τˆ = τ > t if
θ
θˆ
= 1
te > ta = τˆ > τ > t if 1 <
θ
θˆ
< 1− S
′ + S∗′
epxpx + β∗
te > ta = τˆ > t > τ if
θ
θˆ
> 1− S
′ + S∗′
epxpx + β∗
(3.57)
We summarize our results in the following proposition
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Proposition 8. If identical countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose pollution
policies but otherwise pursue free trade, then
1. if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if θˆ = θ, then the (equivalent) environmental
tax in the internationally tradable and nontradable quota is the same and is higher than
the case when countries use taxes to regulate pollution;
2. if pollution is not a pure global public bad, i.e., if θ > θˆ, then the (equivalent) environmen-
tal tax rate is the highest (equal to the autarkic level) when internationally nontradable
quotas are the policy instruments; the (equivalent) tax rate is higher (lower) under inter-
nationally tradable quotas as compared to the situation in which taxes are used to regulate
pollution if θ
θˆ
< (>) 1− S′+S∗
′
epxpx+β
∗ ;
3. if pollution is not a pure global public bad, i.e., if θ > θˆ, pollution is the lowest (equal
to the autarkic level) when internationally nontradable quotas are the policy instruments
and pollution is the highest when the countries use taxes (internationally tradable quotas)
to regulate pollution if, in addition, θ
θˆ
< (>) 1− S′+S∗
′
epxpx+β
∗ .
Given our symmetric specification, and that no trade takes place in equilibrium, it follows
that welfare (W ) under the different policy instruments can be ranked as follows
W efficient > W autarky = W quota = W tradable quota > W tax if
θ
θˆ
= 1
W efficient > W autarky = W quota > W tradable quota > W tax if 1 <
θ
θˆ
< 1− S
′ + S∗′
epxpx + β∗
W efficient > W autarky = W quota > W tax > W tradable quota if
θ
θˆ
> 1− S
′ + S∗′
epxpx + β∗
Hence,
Proposition 9. If identical countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose pollution
policies but otherwise pursue free trade, then
1. if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if θˆ = θ, the internationally nontradable and
tradable quota equilibria are equivalent to the autarky equilibrium, and strictly welfare-
dominate the tax equilibrium;
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2. if the marginal damage from domestic emissions is higher than that from transboundary
pollution, i.e., if θ > θˆ, the internationally nontradable quota equilibrium is equivalent
to the autarky equilibrium and strictly welfare-superior to the internationally tradable
quota equilibrium and the tax equilibrium; the internationally tradable quota equilibrium
strictly welfare dominates (is strictly welfare dominated by) the tax equilibrium if θ
θˆ
< (>)
1− S′+S∗
′
epxpx+β
∗ .
3.6 Generalization
In this section we retain our assumptions regarding preferences, but generalize the pro-
duction possibility function used above such that emissions and output are not necessarily
in one-to-one correspondence. The model presented here nests the case in which pollution
is generated as a by-product of production of both goods. It also allows for substitutability
between inputs that can reduce emissions, the possibility of abatement and having polluting
as well as non-polluting inputs. Given this generalization, in this section we consider policies
on emissions, i.e., pollution taxes and quotas. However, we maintain our earlier assumption of
quasi-linear preferences, so that the income effect on demand for X is zero, i.e., epu = e∗pu∗ = 0,
where p is the consumer price of good X. We start by describing the structure of the model
and then analyze the effects of a movement from autarky to free trade under different policy
instruments.
We assume, as before, that Y is the numeraire good, hence, py ≡ 1. The production
possibility frontier of the home country is
g(x, y, z;
−→
V ) ≥ 0; gx < 0, gy < 0, gz > 0, gvi > 0 (3.58)
where z is pollution and
−→
V is the vector of inputs. The foreign country’s production possibility
frontier is similar.
Total pollution in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
Z = θz + θˆz∗, Z∗ = θˆz + θz∗; θˆ ∈ (0, θ] (3.59)
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Preferences of the representative agent are the same as in the rest of the chapter and the
home country’s utility function is repeated here for convenience
U(cx, cy, Z) = φ(cx, cy)− ηZ; φcx , φcy , η > 0
Let us now consider the effects of trade liberalization on pollution and welfare under dif-
ferent policy instruments. As in the rest of the chapter, we consider three different policy
instruments10: i) countries tax domestic emissions to regulate pollution, ii) the policy instru-
ment is internationally nontradable pollution quotas, and iii) governments use emission quotas
to regulate pollution, but these quotas are tradable across countries.
3.6.1 Taxes
The only policy instrument available to each government is a tax on emissions. Let tz
and t∗z denote the pollution taxes in the home and foreign countries, respectively. Equilibrium
is described by the balance of trade constraints for the two countries and a market clearing
condition:
e(p, u+ η{θz + θˆz∗}) = R(p, tz) + tzz (3.60)
e∗(p, u∗ + η{θˆz + θz∗}) = R∗(p, t∗z) + t∗zz∗ (3.61)
ep + e∗p = x+ x
∗ (3.62a)
x = Rp, x∗ = R∗p (3.62b)
z = −Rtz , z∗ = −R∗t∗z (3.62c)
where Eq.s (3.60), (3.61) and (3.62) are the resource constraints for the home and foreign
countries, and the market clearing conditions, respectively; p (p∗) and tz (t∗z) are the price
of X and the pollution tax in the home (foreign) country, respectively. We assume that
governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their domestic tax to maximize
welfare. Furthermore, all tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum to consumers.
10Note that, in this section, pollution and output policies are no longer equivalent, so we carry out our analysis
using pollution policies.
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Differentiating the home country’s resource constraint, Eq. (3.60), with respect to tz gives
us the home country’s best response function as a function of the foreign country’s tax
eu
du
dtz
= (Rp − ep) dp
dtz
+ (tz − euηθ) dz
dtz
− euηθˆ dz
∗
dtz
(3.63)
The first term, the terms of trade effect, depends on whether the country is a net importer
of X and the pollution intensity of X which, in turn, determines the direction of change in
the price of X due to a change in the pollution tax, tz. The second term is the effect of
changes in tz on domestic pollution: as tz increases, domestic emissions decline. An increase
in the domestic environmental tax reduces domestic production of the pollution intensive good
resulting, under trade, in an increase in the world price of that good, which increases foreign
production and emissions. Thus, the last term reflects the transboundary pollution effect.
Similarly, the best response function of the foreign country is
e∗u∗
du∗
dt∗z
= (R∗p − e∗p)
dp∗
dt∗z
+ (t∗z − e∗u∗ηθ)
dz∗
dt∗z
− e∗u∗ηθˆ
dz
dt∗z
(3.64)
Note that Eq.s (3.63) and (3.64) can also be solved for the optimal autarky pollution taxes.
In autarky domestic production equals domestic consumption, i.e., Rp(.) = ep(.), and foreign
pollution is independent of domestic policy, i.e., dz
∗
dtz
= 0; hence, from Eq. (3.63) we have
eu
du
dtz
= (tz − euηθ)dzdt . Since dzdt < 0 and eu > 0, it follows that the optimal autarky pollution
tax for the home country is
taz = euηθ (3.65)
Similarly, the optimal autarky pollution tax in the foreign country is
ta∗z = e
∗
uηθ (3.66)
Under free trade both z and z∗ are affected by the environmental policy in the other country.
Differentiating Eq. (3.62a) with respect to tz yields
dp
dtz
=
Rptz
β + β∗
(3.67)
where, as in previous sections, β = epp − Rpp and β∗ = e∗pp − R∗pp. Hence, dpdtz > 0 if X
is relatively more pollution intensive, i.e., if Rptz < 0 (since (β + β∗) < 0). Furthermore,
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the change in foreign pollution due to a change in the home country’s pollution tax is dz
∗
dtz
=
dz∗
dp
dp
dtz
= −R∗pt∗z
dp
dtz
, and using Eq. (3.67) we have
dz∗
dtz
= −R
∗
pt∗zRptz
β + β∗
(3.68)
Since (β+β∗) < 0, dz
∗
dtz
> 0 under symmetry, irrespective of whether X or Y is relatively more
pollution intensive.
In the case of no externality, i.e., if η = 0, the home country’s best response function, Eq.
(3.63), reduces to
eu
du
dtz
= (Rp − ep) dp
dtz
+ tz
dz
dtz
If the home country is a net importer of X (Mx > 0), and X is pollution intensive, i.e.,
Rptz < 0, then
dp
dtz
> 0 and
(
du
dtz
)
tz=0
< 0. This is the standard terms of trade argument in
effect which implies that, when commercial policies are not available, a large country should
subsidize domestic production of the importable.
Now consider the case of a transboundary pollution externality and suppose that the home
and foreign countries are identical. Thus, if tz = t∗z, then Mx = 0. Evaluating Eq. (3.63) at
the autarky solution, taz = euηθ, we have(
du
dtz
)
tz=taz
= ηθˆ
[
RptzR
∗
pt∗z
β + β∗
]
< 0 (3.69)
The result in Eq. (3.69) follows because increases in domestic taxes increase foreign pollution,
i.e., dz
∗
dtz
> 0. Hence, due to the transboundary pollution effect, each country’s optimal response
is to lower the pollution tax under free trade as compared to autarky. This results in a race to
the bottom in pollution taxes that leaves both countries worse off due to trade liberalization.
Note that, even if countries are not identical, by continuity, our results hold provided the
countries are sufficiently similar.
3.6.2 Quotas
Now consider the case when both countries use pollution quotas to regulate domestic pollu-
tion. Let Lz and L∗z denote the home and foreign quota levels, respectively. Define the (shadow)
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value of a quota in the home (foreign) country as τˆz (τˆ∗z ). Equilibrium is now described by
e(p, u+ η{θz + θˆz∗}) = R(p, τˆz) + τˆzLz (3.70)
e∗(p, u∗ + η{θˆz + θz∗}) = R∗(p, τˆ∗z ) + τˆ∗zL∗z (3.71)
ep + e∗p = x+ x
∗ (3.72a)
x = Rp, x∗ = R∗p (3.72b)
z = −Rτˆz ≤ Lz, z∗ = −R∗τˆ∗z ≤ L∗z (3.72c)
where Eq.s (3.70), (3.71) and (3.72) are the resource constraints for the home and foreign
countries, and the market clearing conditions, respectively. The quota rents (revenues) are
rebated lump-sum to consumers. We assume that the quotas bind; hence, τˆz, τˆ∗z > 0, and Eq.
(3.72c) holds with equality.
The best response function of the home country in terms of the foreign country’s quota is
derived by differentiating Eq. (3.70) with respect to Lz
eu
du
dLz
= (Rp − ep) dp
dLz
+ (τˆz − euηθ) dz
dLz
− euηθˆ dz
∗
dLz
(3.73)
The first and second terms are the terms of trade and domestic pollution effects, respectively,
while the last term is the transboundary pollution effect. If foreign production changes follow-
ing changes in domestic quotas, then it affects domestic welfare via a change in the incidence
of transboundary pollution.
The foreign country’s best response function is
e∗u∗
du∗
dL∗z
= (R∗p − e∗p)
dp
dL∗z
+ (τˆ∗z − e∗u∗ηθ)
dz∗
dL∗z
− e∗u∗ηθˆ
dz
dL∗z
(3.74)
Eq.s (3.73) and (3.74) can be solved for the optimal autarky pollution quotas. In autarky
domestic consumption equals domestic production, i.e., ep(.) = Rp(.), the quota binds, i.e.,
z = Lz, and foreign pollution is independent of domestic policy, i.e., dz
∗
dLz
= 0; hence, from Eq.
(3.73), we have eu dudLz = τˆz − euηθ. Since eu > 0, the domestic pollution tax equivalent of the
optimal autarky pollution quota for the home country is
τˆaz = euηθ (3.75)
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Similarly, the pollution tax equivalent of the optimal autarky pollution quota for the foreign
country is
τˆa∗z = e
∗
u∗ηθ (3.76)
Now consider each country’s optimal non-cooperative environmental policy, given a com-
mitment to free trade. Let za and za∗ be the autarky pollution (quota) levels in the home and
foreign countries, respectively. Furthermore, suppose that the countries are identical. Hence,
if τˆz, τˆ∗z > 0, Lz = za = za∗ = L∗z, then ∃N(za) such that, for Lz ∈ N [za], L∗z binds. Hence(
dz∗
dLz
)
Lz=za
= 0 (3.77)
If L∗z = za∗ = za = Lz, then at Lz = za, z(Lz, L∗z) = za, and Rp(.) = ep(.). Thus, evaluating
Eq. (3.73) at the autarky solution, Lz = za, we have(
du
dLz
)
Lz=za
= 0 (3.78)
Hence, for our symmetric specification, the optimal domestic quota and the equivalent pollution
tax are the same in the free trade and autarky equilibrium.
3.6.3 Tradable Quotas
Now we consider the situation in which countries use emission quotas to regulate pollution;
however, these quotas are tradable across countries. Hence, the market price of pollution
quotas, τz, is equalized across countries. Governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively
choose their quota levels to maximize welfare. The equilibrium conditions are
e(p, u+ η{θz + θˆz∗}) = R(p, τz) + τzLz (3.79)
e∗(p, u∗ + η{θˆz + θz∗}) = R∗(p, τz) + τzL∗z (3.80)
ep + e∗p = x+ x
∗ = Rp +R∗p (3.81a)
z + z∗ = −Rτz −R∗τz ≤ Lz + L∗z (3.81b)
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where Eq.s (3.79), (3.80) and (3.81) are the balance of trade constraints for the home and
foreign countries, and the market clearing conditions, respectively. We assume that the quotas
bind; hence, τz > 0 and
−Rτz −R∗τz = Lz + L∗z (3.82)
Differentiating Eq. (3.79) with respect to Lz gives us the best response function of the
home country in terms of the foreign country’s quota
eu
du
dLz
= (Rp − ep) dp
dLz
+ (L+Rτz)
dτz
dLz
+ (τz − euηθ) dz
dLz
+ (τz − euηθˆ) dz
∗
dLz
(3.83)
The net domestic welfare effect of issuing an additional quota depends on four different effects.
The first term is the terms of trade effect, while the second term is the quota revenue effect.
The third term is the effect on domestic welfare through changes in domestic emissions: if
some of the new quotas are used domestically, then domestic emissions increase. The last
term, the transboundary pollution effect, depends on whether foreign pollution increases with
an increase in domestic quotas and on the public bad characteristic of pollution.
The foreign country’s best response function is
e∗u∗
du∗
dL∗z
= (R∗p − e∗p)
dp
dL∗z
+ (L∗z +R
∗
τz)
dτz
dL∗z
+ (τz − e∗u∗ηθ)
dz∗
dL∗z
+ (τz − e∗u∗ηθˆ)
dz
dL∗z
(3.84)
Differentiating Eq.s (3.81a) and (3.82) with respect to Lz we have, respectively,
(β + β∗)
dp
dLz
=
(
Rpτz +R
∗
pτz
) dτz
dLz
(3.85)
(
Rτzτz +R
∗
τzτz
) dτz
dLz
+
(
Rpτz +R
∗
pτz
) dp
dLz
= −1 (3.86)
The above two equations, together, imply
dτz
dLz
= − (β + β
∗)
(β + β∗)(Rτzτz +R∗τzτz) + (Rpτz +R∗pτz)2
(3.87)
Since both countries face the same price vectors, if we define J(p, τz) ≡ R(p, τz) + R∗(p, τz),
then J(p, τz) is convex in prices. Hence, the denominator in the above equation is negative
and dτzdLz < 0. Furthermore, since, z
∗ = −R∗τz ,
dz∗
dLz
= −R∗τzτz
dτz
dLz
−R∗pτz
dp
dLz
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which, using Eq.s (3.85) and (3.87), implies
dz∗
dLz
=
(β + β∗)R∗τzτz +R
∗
pτz(Rpτz +R
∗
pτz)
(β + β∗)(Rτzτz +R∗τzτz) + (Rpτz +R∗pτz)2
∈ (0, 1) (3.88)
Furthermore, if both countries have the same technology and face the same price vector, then
dz∗
dLz
= dzdLz =
1
2 .
If the home and foreign countries are identical, then, if Lz = za = za∗ = L∗z, then ep(.) =
Rp(.) and τz = euηθ. Evaluating Eq. (3.83) at the autarky solution, Lz = za, we have(
eu
du
dLz
)
Lz=za
=
(
τaz − euηθˆ
) dz∗
dLz
(3.89)
(τaz − euηθˆ) > 0 if the marginal damage from domestic pollution is higher than that from
transboundary pollution, i.e., if θ > θˆ, and Eq. (3.88) ⇒ dz∗dLz > 0; thus, Eq. (3.89) implies
(since eu > 0) (
du
dLz
)
Lz=za
> 0 if θ > θˆ (3.90)
Hence, when pollution is not a pure global public bad, in the symmetric equilibrium, each
country’s optimal response is to issue more quotas under free trade as compared to autarky.
This leads to a race to the bottom in environmental policy and leaves both countries worse
off as a result of trade liberalization. Moreover, even if the countries are not identical, by
continuity, our results hold if countries are sufficiently similar.
However, if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if θˆ = θ, then Eq. (3.89) implies(
du
dLz
)
Lz=za
= 0 if θˆ = θ (3.91)
Hence, if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if θˆ = θ, then in the symmetric equilibrium,
the free trade and autarky equilibrium is the same when countries use internationally tradable
quotas to regulate pollution.
3.6.4 Pollution and Welfare
It is straightforward to derive the Pareto efficient tax
tez = euηθ + e
∗
u∗ηθˆ > t
a
z (3.92)
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The optimal free trade pollution tax for the home country, when both countries are identical
and use taxes to regulate pollution, is
tz = euηθ +
euηθˆ(RptzR∗pt∗z)
(β + β∗)Rtztz
< taz (3.93)
When identical countries use internationally nontradable quotas to regulate domestic pollution,
the pollution tax equivalent of the optimal free trade emission quota is
τˆz = euηθ = taz (3.94)
However, when the pollution quotas are tradable across countries, the pollution tax equivalent
of the optimal free trade quota is
τz = euηθ − eu(θ − θˆ)η
[
(β + β∗)R∗τzτz +R
∗
pτz(Rpτz +R
∗
pτz)
(β + β∗)(Rτzτz +R∗τzτz) + (Rpτz +R∗pτz)2
]
(3.95)
If pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., θˆ = θ, then τz = taz . However, if the marginal
damage from domestic pollution is higher than that from transboundary pollution, i.e., θ > θˆ,
then τz < taz . Furthermore, it can be verified that τz > tz if
θ < θˆ
[
1− (RptzR
∗
pt∗z)
DRtztz(β + β∗)
]
where D ≡
[
(β+β∗)R∗τzτz+R
∗
pτz
(Rpτz+R
∗
pτz
)
(β+β∗)(Rτzτz+R∗τzτz )+(Rpτz+R
∗
pτz
)2
]
. Given our assumption of symmetry and since
both countries face the same prices, D = 12 , which implies that τz > tz if
θ < θˆ
[
1 +
(Rptz)2
Rtztz(Rpp − epp)
]
(3.96)
Hence,
tez > t
a
z = τˆz = τz > tz if
θ
θˆ
= 1
tez > t
a
z = τˆz > τz > tz if 1 <
θ
θˆ
< 1 +
(Rptz)2
Rtztz(Rpp − epp)
tez > t
a
z = τˆz > tz > τz if
θ
θˆ
> 1 +
(Rptz)2
Rtztz(Rpp − epp)
(3.97)
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Welfare (Wz) under the different policy instruments can be ranked as follows
W efficientz > W
autarky
z = W
quota
z = W
tradable quota
z > W
tax
z if
θ
θˆ
= 1
W efficientz > W
autarky
z = W
quota
z > W
tradable quota
z > W
tax
z if 1 <
θ
θˆ
< 1 +
(Rptz)2
Rtztz(Rpp − epp)
W efficientz > W
autarky
z = W
quota
z > W
tax
z > W
tradable quota
z if
θ
θˆ
> 1 +
(Rptz)2
Rtztz(Rpp − epp)
We have shown, in this section, that in a more general framework, if pollution and output
are not necessarily in one-to-one correspondence, the results that we derived earlier in the
chapter still hold.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
We have used a simple model to highlight the effect of trade liberalization in the presence
of transboundary pollution. The autarky equilibrium is inefficient because countries do not
internalize the transboundary effects of domestic emissions. The Pareto efficient equilibrium
requires both countries to internalize the effects of transboundary pollution and is, naturally,
welfare improving. The movement from autarky to free trade can be welfare reducing. If coun-
tries are identical and environmental taxes are set non-cooperatively, then the transboundary
pollution effect, by increasing foreign emissions under trade, reduces the benefits of tighter
domestic environmental policy. Although, in equilibrium, there is no trade in our symmetric
model, the possibility of trade provides the opportunity to influence world prices and influence
foreign production and emissions, thereby leading to a race to the bottom in environmental
taxes, which makes both countries worse off relative to autarky.
When quotas are the policy instruments, changes in domestic policy do not affect foreign
emissions and there is no incentive to distort domestic policy. Even when the quotas are
tradable across countries, if pollution is a pure global public bad, then there is no race to
the bottom. However, if pollution is not a pure global public bad, then there is a race to the
bottom in environmental policy with internationally tradable permits, which, again, makes both
countries worse off as compared to autarky. Here the lower marginal damage from increased
61
issue of pollution permits under free trade as compared to autarky is the driving force behind
the race to the bottom.
The internationally nontradable quota equilibrium welfare-dominates both the internation-
ally tradable quota equilibrium and the tax equilibrium. The internationally tradable quota
equilibrium strictly welfare-dominates (is welfare-dominated by) the tax equilibrium depending
on the severity of transboundary pollution and the relative slopes of the demand and supply
schedules in the two countries. Pollution is the lowest when internationally nontradable quo-
tas are the policy instruments and the pollution ranking of the internationally tradable quota
equilibrium and the tax equilibrium depends on the ratio of transboundary to domestic pol-
lution and the relative slopes of the supply and demand schedules. All these results hold in
our generalization of the model. Although we have used identical countries to isolate the role
of carbon leakage, it should be clear that, by continuity, our results hold even if countries are
not identical, provided they are sufficiently similar. We find that internationally nontradable
quotas are welfare-superior to taxes. Other factors, such as imperfect competition or imperfect
information, might favor price-based policies. Hence, this warrants a more careful analysis of
the choice and restriction of policy instruments in the presence of transboundary externalities
and non-cooperative policy settings. The importance of the proper choice of policy instruments
becomes more crucial the more similar countries are, because certain instruments may result
in both countries being worse off with trade liberalization, while others do not. An important
policy implication is that, when countries negotiate on free trade, it might be beneficial to
negotiate on the policy instrument, if not the exact level of the policy instrument, that is used
to regulate the domestic externality in each country.
A possible avenue of future research is to allow for imperfect information between countries,
and verify if the welfare rankings of policy instruments derived in this chapter hold in a
sequential game, where countries try to infer about the preference or technology of each other
from their choice of policy instrument.
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CHAPTER 4. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we analyzed the effect of trade liberalization on domestic envi-
ronmental policy and welfare when countries set their domestic environmental policies non-
cooperatively, in the presence of an international transboundary externality, under free trade.
In this chapter we extend the analysis carried out in the previous chapter. This chapter follows
the structure of the previous one; however, we explicitly model differences in the production
possibility frontiers and preferences between countries which can lead to (potentially welfare
improving) trade in equilibrium. We analyze how the choice of the policy instrument used to
regulate the domestic externality affects the outcome of trade liberalization.
We employ a two good model of trade between two countries. Production of one of the
goods, X, generates pollution as a by-product, that reduces welfare in both countries, but
does not affect the production possibility set. In this framework we analyze the effect of a
movement from autarky to free trade on environmental policy, pollution and welfare. We find
that, although taxes and quotas are equivalent under autarky, this equivalence does not hold in
the free trade equilibrium. As in the previous chapter, if countries are identical, there is a race
to the bottom when countries use taxes to regulate pollution, but not when the environmental
policy instrument is a quota.
When countries are not identical and there is trade in equilibrium, the importer of X lowers
its environmental tax under free trade as compared to autarky. As is well known, the standard
terms of trade argument implies that a large country should subsidize domestic production of
the importable when commercial policies are not available. Furthermore, the transboundary
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pollution effect, irrespective of the direction of trade, motivates governments to lower the tax on
the polluting good to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution from the other country.
Hence, in the importer of X, both the terms of trade effect and the transboundary pollution
effect work in the same direction to reduce the environmental tax. In the exporter of the
polluting good, the terms of trade effect tends to increase the tax on the polluting good, while
the transboundary pollution effect works in the opposite direction. Hence, the exporter of X
lowers (increases) its tax on X if the transboundary pollution effect dominates (is dominated
by) the terms of trade effect. The welfare effect of trade liberalization depends on whether
the welfare gain from the opportunity to trade or the welfare loss due to increased pollution
dominates.
When countries use quotas to regulate pollution, then production of the polluting good
decreases (increases) in the importer (exporter) of the polluting good, while total (world)
production is unchanged as countries move from autarky to free trade. When pollution is a
pure global public bad, world pollution rises (declines) if the exporter’s pollution intensity is
higher (lower) than that of the importer of X.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section presents the model. Sec-
tions 4.3 and 4.4 look at the autarky and efficient equilibrium, respectively. The free trade
equilibrium is presented in Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 analyzes some special cases. Section
4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 The Model
Consider a standard two good (X,Y ) model of trade between two countries, a home country
and a foreign country (denoted by ∗ ). Home and foreign production possibility frontiers are,
respectively,
g(x, y) ≥ 0, g(x∗, y∗) ≥ 0; gi < 0, i = x, y, x∗, y∗ (4.1)
Assume the following specific functional forms
y ≤ A−
(
x2
2γ
− αx
γ
)
, y∗ ≤ A∗ −
(
x∗2
2γ
− α
∗x∗
γ
)
(4.2)
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Emissions are a by-product of the production of X; good Y does not pollute. We assume that
production of one unit of X in the home country generates θ units of emissions in the home
country and, due to transboundary pollution, λθ units of emissions in the foreign country.
Similarly, production of one unit of X in the foreign country generates θ∗ units of emissions in
the foreign country and, due to transboundary pollution, λθ∗ units of emissions in the home
country. Thus, total pollution in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
z = θx+ λθ∗x∗, z∗ = λθx+ θ∗x∗; λ ∈ (0, 1] (4.3)
When λ < 1, domestic pollution causes a higher marginal damage than transboundary pollu-
tion, while pollution is a pure global public bad if λ = 1.
Let cx(c∗x) and cy(c∗y) denote consumption of X and Y in the home (foreign) country.
Preferences of the representative agents in the home and foreign countries are given by the
following utility functions
U(cx, cy, z) = cy +
β
δ
cx− c
2
x
2δ
−ηz, U(c∗x, c∗y, z∗) = c∗y +
β∗
δ
c∗x−
c∗2x
2δ
−η∗z∗; η, η∗ > 0 (4.4)
Assume that good Y is the numeraire good; hence, py ≡ 1. Given the above production and
preference structure, demand and supply functions for X in the home and foreign countries
are, respectively,
cx = β − δp; c∗x = β∗ − δp∗ (4.5)
x = α+ γpf ; x∗ = α∗ + γpf∗ (4.6)
where, p, pf (= p − t), and t are the home country’s consumer price of X, producer price of
X and production tax on X, respectively. Similarly, p∗, pf∗(= p∗ − t∗), and t∗ are the foreign
country’s consumer price of X, producer price of X and production tax on X, respectively.
The import demand functions of the home country and foreign country are, respectively,
Mx = (β − α)− (γ + δ)p+ γt; M∗x = (β∗ − α∗)− (γ + δ)p∗ + γt∗ (4.7)
The inverse demand and supply functions are, respectively,
p =
β − cx
δ
; p∗ =
β∗ − c∗x
δ
(4.8)
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pf =
x− α
γ
; pf∗ =
x∗ − α∗
γ
(4.9)
Given our specification of preferences and technology, assuming that there are no border
taxes (tariffs), the home country’s welfare can be written in terms of the standard partial
equilibrium welfare measure as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tax revenue
less the damage from pollution:
W = A+
∫ cx
0
(
β − cx
δ
)
dcx − pcx + pfx−
∫ x
0
(
x− α
γ
)
dx+ tx− ηz
i.e.,
W = A+
(
β
δ
cx − c
2
x
2δ
)
− pMx −
(
x2
2γ
− αx
γ
)
− η (θx+ λθ∗x∗) (4.10)
Similarly, foreign welfare is given by
W ∗ = A∗ +
(
β∗
δ
c∗x −
c∗2x
2δ
)
− p∗M∗x −
(
x∗2
2γ
− α
∗x∗
γ
)
− η∗ (θ∗x∗ + λθx) (4.11)
4.3 Autarky
We first solve the domestic social planner’s problem. In autarky, Mx = 0, hence the
autarkic consumer price of X in the home country is
pa =
β − α
γ + δ
+
γ
γ + δ
t (4.12)
The benevolent home government chooses its domestic production tax, t, to maximize
its own citizen’s welfare (Eq. (4.10)), which yields the following optimality condition (since
Max = 0,
dpa
dt =
γ
γ+δ and
dpa∗
dt = 0)
dW a
dt
= (t− ηθ)dx
dt
Thus, the home country’s optimal autarky production tax is (since dxdt < 0)
ta = ηθ (4.13)
Similarly, the foreign optimal autarky production tax is
ta∗ = η∗θ∗ (4.14)
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The equivalent autarky tax on emissions is
taz = η; t
a∗
z = η
∗
i.e., a tax equal to the domestic marginal damage from pollution. Note that this autarky
solution is inefficient from the global perspective as governments do not internalize the trans-
boundary effect of their emissions.
The maximized autarky welfare levels in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
W = A+
(γβ + αδ − γδηθ)2
2γδ(γ + δ)
− ληθ
∗(γβ∗ + α∗δ − γδη∗θ∗)
(γ + δ)
(4.15)
W ∗ = A∗ +
(γβ∗ + α∗α∗δ − γδη∗θ∗)2
2γδ(γ + δ)
− λη
∗θ(γβ + αδ − γδηθ)
(γ + δ)
(4.16)
The difference between the autarky (consumer) prices in the home and foreign countries is
pa − pa∗ = (β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗)
γ + δ
+
γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)
γ + δ
(4.17)
We define the natural pattern of trade as that determined by the autarkic prices, i.e., it
is the direction of trade that would have prevailed if both countries retained their autarkic
environmental policies. Hence, the natural pattern of trade is determined by the sign of the
following expression
(β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)
If (β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗) > (<) 0, then the home country is the natural importer
(exporter) of X.
4.4 Efficient Equilibrium
We obtain the Pareto efficient allocations by solving a social planner’s problem that maxi-
mizes the welfare of the home country subject to meeting a certain utility target for the foreign
country. Naturally, the social planner accounts for the domestic and transboundary external-
ities. It is straightforward to verify that the Pareto efficient taxes on the production of the
polluting good, X, in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
te = (η + λη∗)θ; te∗ = (η∗ + λη)θ∗ (4.18)
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The Pareto efficient emission taxes in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
tez = (η + λη
∗); te∗z = (η
∗ + λη) (4.19)
and the price of X is
pe =
β − α
γ + δ
+
γ
γ + δ
(η + λη∗)θ, pe∗ =
β∗ − α∗
γ + δ
+
γ
γ + δ
(η∗ + λη)θ∗ (4.20)
Thus, efficiency need not require equalization of environmental taxes across countries, but it
does require that both countries internalize the domestic and transboundary effects of emis-
sions. However, if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if λ = 1, then the Pareto efficient
tax on pollution is, in fact, equalized across countries.
The difference in the efficient (consumer) prices of X between the two countries,
pe − pe∗ = (β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ((η + λη∗)θ − (η∗ + λη)θ∗)
(γ + δ)
(4.21)
determines the efficient pattern of trade. In particular, if (β−α)− (β∗−α∗) + γ((η+ λη∗)θ−
(η∗ + λη)θ∗) > (<) 0, then the home country imports (exports) X in the efficient equilibrium.
4.5 Free Trade
In this section we analyze the effects of a movement from autarky to free trade and how
the choice of the policy instrument governs these effects. We consider each country’s optimal
non-cooperative environmental policy, given that they have committed to free trade and that
they act simultaneously. We consider two cases: i) governments regulate emissions using a
tax on domestic emissions (equivalent to a tax on the production of X), and ii) emission (or
production) quotas are used to regulate pollution.
4.5.1 Taxes
The only policy instrument available to each country is a tax on emissions. Given the
one-to-one correspondence between output and emissions, this is equivalent to a tax on the
production of X, denoted by t and t∗, and we carry out our analysis using equivalent production
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policies. Let p be the (world) consumer price of X. The balance of trade condition, Mx+M∗x =
0, implies
p =
(β − α) + (β∗ − α∗)
2(γ + δ)
+
γ(t+ t∗)
2(γ + δ)
(4.22)
The home country’s welfare is given by Eq. (4.10). Differentiating Eq. (4.10) with respect
to t, we get the home country’s best response function as a function of the foreign country’s
tax
dW
dt
= (x− cx)dp
dt
+ (t− ηθ)dx
dt
− ληθ∗dx
∗
dt
(4.23)
The first term, the terms of trade effect, depends on whether the country is a net importer
of X. The second term is the effect of changes in t on domestic pollution: as t increases,
domestic emissions decline. An increase in the domestic environmental tax reduces domestic
production of the polluting good resulting, under trade, in an increase in p, which increases
foreign production and emissions. Thus, the last term reflects the transboundary pollution
effect.
Similarly, the foreign country’s best response function as a function of the home country’s
tax is
dW ∗
dt∗
= (x∗ − c∗x)
dp
dt∗
+ (t∗ − η∗θ∗)dx
∗
dt∗
− λη∗θ dx
dt∗
(4.24)
Since dxdt = γ
(
dp
dt − 1
)
, dx
∗
dt = γ
dp
dt and
dp
dt =
γ
2(γ+δ) , the home country’s best response
function is
t = ηθ − γηθ + ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗)) + 2λγηθ∗ − γt∗
(3γ + 4δ)
(4.25)
Similarly, the foreign country’s best response function is
t∗ = η∗θ∗ − γη
∗θ∗ − ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗)) + 2λγη∗θ − γt
(3γ + 4δ)
(4.26)
Solving the home and foreign best response functions, Eq.s (4.25) and (4.26), simultaneously
we have
t = ηθ − ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
4(γ + δ)
− λγ ((3γ + 4δ)ηθ
∗ + γη∗θ)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.27)
and,
t∗ = η∗θ∗ +
((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
4(γ + δ)
− λγ ((3γ + 4δ)η
∗θ + γηθ∗)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.28)
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In the absence of a pollution externality, the second term, the terms of trade effect, alone
determines the output tax. If η = η∗ = 0 and (β−α) > (β∗−α∗), i.e., if the home country is a
natural importer of X, then the home country’s optimal free trade output tax is negative. Here,
the standard terms of trade argument applies, whereby, in the absence of commercial policies,
it is optimal for a large country to subsidize domestic production of the importable. Similarly,
the foreign country’s optimal free trade output tax is positive. However, in the presence of
a pollution externality, the last term, the transboundary pollution effect, tends to reduce the
domestic environmental tax irrespective of the pattern of trade. Its magnitude depends on
the severity of transboundary pollution: as λ increases, the transboundary pollution effect
increases, and this tends to lower the domestic environmental tax. Hence, the free trade
output tax is decreasing in λ in both countries. Furthermore, note that the sum of the taxes
in the two countries, t+ t∗ = ηθ + η∗θ∗ − λγ(ηθ∗+η∗θ)(γ+2δ) , is independent of α, β, α∗ and β∗.
Proposition 10. If there is no motive for trade between the countries, i.e., if (β−α) +γηθ =
(β∗−α∗)+γη∗θ∗, such that the autarky relative (consumer) price is the same in both countries,
and countries set domestic environmental taxes non-cooperatively, then both countries lower
environmental taxes under free trade as compared to autarky.
The above proposition reflects the race to the bottom result of Chapter 3.
The transboundary pollution effect always tends to lower the tax on X. However, in
the presence of a motive for trade, if the home country is a natural importer of X, i.e., if
(β − α) + γηθ > (β∗ − α∗) + γη∗θ∗, the terms of trade effect tends to reduce the importer’s
environmental tax. Thus, the terms of trade effect and the transboundary pollution effect,
reinforce each other and t < ta. The change in the environmental tax in the home country due
to trade liberalization is
t− ta = −((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
4(γ + δ)
− λγ ((3γ + 4δ)ηθ
∗ + γη∗θ)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
< 0 (4.29)
The terms of trade effect tends to increase the environmental tax in the foreign country (ex-
porter of X); thus, the transboundary pollution effect and the terms of trade effect work in
opposite directions for an exporter of X. The change in the foreign country’s output tax due
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to a movement from autarky to free trade is
t∗ − ta∗ = ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
4(γ + δ)
− λγ ((3γ + 4δ)η
∗θ + γηθ∗)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.30)
Hence t∗ < ta∗ if, and only if,
((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)) < λγ ((3γ + 4δ)η
∗θ + γηθ∗)
(γ + 2δ)
(4.31)
Again, as the severity of transboundary pollution, λ, increases, it tends to make the trans-
boundary pollution effect stronger, which, in turn, tends to make it more likely that the
exporter of the polluting good also reduces its domestic environmental tax under free trade
relative to autarky. We summarize these results in the following proposition
Proposition 11. If countries choose their domestic environmental taxes non-cooperatively,
then the natural importer of X unambiguously lowers its environmental tax under free trade
as compared to autarky, while in the natural exporter of X, the environmental tax increases
(decreases) if the terms of trade effect dominates (is dominated by) the transboundary pollution
effect.
Using Eq.s (4.22), (4.27) and (4.28), the free trade (consumer) price of X can be derived
as
p =
(β − α) + (β∗ − α∗)
2(γ + δ)
+
γ
2(γ + δ)
(
ηθ + η∗θ∗ − λγ(ηθ
∗ + η∗θ)
(γ + 2δ)
)
(4.32)
The change in the home country’s production of X is
∆x = x− xa = −γ ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
4(γ + δ)
− λγ
2 (γη∗θ − (γ + 4δ)ηθ∗)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.33)
where, xa and x are the home country’s supply of X in autarky and free trade, respec-
tively. If there is no motive for trade, i.e., if (β − α) + γηθ = (β∗ − α∗) + γη∗θ∗, the
home country’s production of X increases due to trade liberalization if (γδ + 4)
η
η∗
θ∗
θ >
γ
δ .
However, if there is a motive for trade, the home country’s production of X increases if
ηθ∗ > γη
∗θ
(γ+4δ) +
(γ+2δ)((β−α)−(β∗−α∗)+γ(ηθ−η∗θ∗))
λγ(γ+4δ) . Similarly, the change in the foreign production
of X is
∆x∗ = x∗ − xa∗ = γ ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
4(γ + δ)
+
λγ2 ((γ + 4δ)η∗θ − γηθ∗)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.34)
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In the absence of a motive for trade, the foreign country’s production of X increases if (γδ +4) >
γ
δ
η
η∗
θ∗
θ . But, if the foreign country is a natural exporter of X, foreign production of X increases
due to trade liberalization if (γ + 2δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)) + λγ(γ + 4δ)η∗θ >
λγ2ηθ∗. The change in the total world production of X is
∆xw = ∆x+ ∆x∗ =
λγ2δ(ηθ∗ + η∗θ)
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.35)
Hence, total world production of X is independent of α, β, α∗ and β∗, and unambiguously
increases due to a movement from autarky to free trade when countries use taxes to regulate
domestic pollution.
The increase in total pollution in the home country due to trade liberalization is ∆z =
z − za = θ(x− xa) + λθ∗(x∗ − xa∗):
∆z =
γ(λθ∗ − θ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
4(γ + δ)
+
λγ2
(
(γ + 4δ)(η + λη∗)θθ∗ − λγ(ηθ∗2 + η∗θ2))
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.36)
Whether total pollution in the home country increases as a result of trade liberalization depends
on whether the terms of trade effect or the transboundary pollution effect dominates.
The increase in total pollution in the foreign country due to trade liberalization is ∆z∗ =
z∗ − za∗ = θ∗(x∗ − xa∗) + λθ(x− xa):
∆z∗ =
γ(θ∗ − λθ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
4(γ + δ)
+
λγ2
(
(γ + 4δ)(η∗ + λη)θθ∗ − λγ(η∗θ2 + ηθ∗2))
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.37)
When pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if λ = 1, the change in pollution due to a
movement from autarky to free trade is ∆zw = ∆z = ∆z∗ = θ∆x+ θ∗∆x∗,
∆zw =
γ(θ∗ − θ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
4(γ + δ)
+
γ2 [((γ + 4δ)θ∗ − γθ)η∗θ + ((γ + 4δ)θ − γθ∗)ηθ∗]
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.38)
Furthermore, if θ = θ∗, then
∆zw =
γ2δ(η + η∗)θ2
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0
and total world pollution increases as a result of trade liberalization.
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Proposition 12. When countries set environmental taxes non-cooperatively, but otherwise
pursue free trade, if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if λ = 1, and if θ∗ = θ, then
pollution unambiguously increases under free trade as compared to autarky.
The change in the home country’s welfare due to a movement from autarky to free trade is
∆W = W −W a, where W and W a are welfare (as measured by Eq. (4.10)) under free trade
and autarky, respectively,
∆W =
(3γ + 4δ)(γ + 2δ)2 ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))2
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
+
2λγ(γ + 2δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)) (γ(3γ + 4δ)η∗θ)
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
− 2λγ(γ + 2δ) ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)) ((3γ2 + 12γδ + 8δ2)ηθ∗)
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
+
λ2γ2(3γ + 4δ)
(
γ2η2θ∗2 − 2(γ2 + 8γδ + 8δ2)ηη∗θθ∗ + γ2η∗2θ2)
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
(4.39)
Similarly, the change in foreign welfare resulting from trade liberalization is
∆W ∗ =
(3γ + 4δ)(γ + 2δ)2 ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))2
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
− 2λγ(γ + 2δ) ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)) (γ(3γ + 4δ)ηθ∗)
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
+
2λγ(γ + 2δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)) ((3γ2 + 12γδ + 8δ2)η∗θ)
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
+
λ2γ2(3γ + 4δ)
(
γ2η2θ∗2 − 2(γ2 + 8γδ + 8δ2)ηη∗θθ∗ + γ2η∗2θ2)
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
(4.40)
Note that, in the absence of transboundary pollution, i.e., if λ = 0, both countries are unam-
biguously better-off under free trade relative to autarky, if there is a motive for trade.
Using Eq.s (4.39) and (4.40), we can find the change in aggregate (world) welfare 1, ∆Ww,
as the sum of ∆W and ∆W ∗
∆Ww =
(3γ + 4δ)(γ + 2δ)2 ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))2
16(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
+
2λγ(γ + 2δ)(3γ + 2δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)) (η∗θ − ηθ∗)
16(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
+
λ2γ2(3γ + 4δ)
(
γ2η2θ∗2 − 2(γ2 + 8γδ + 8δ2)ηη∗θθ∗ + γ2η∗2θ2)
16(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
(4.41)
1Note that our assumption of quasilinear preferences allows us to add the changes in welfare of the two
countries to determine the change in aggregate world welfare.
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Note that if there is no motive for trade, i.e., if (β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗) = 0, then
both countries gain (lose) due to trade liberalization if γ2(ηθ∗ − η∗θ)2 > (<)16δ(γ + δ)ηη∗θθ∗,
i.e, if
( η
η∗
θ∗
θ
−1)2
η
η∗
θ∗
θ
> (<)16(
γ
δ
+1)
( γ
δ
)2
.
Proposition 13. If countries set domestic environmental taxes non-cooperatively, but pursue
free trade,
1. if there is a motive for trade, then, in the absence of transboundary pollution, both coun-
tries are better-off under free trade as compared to autarky;
2. if there is a motive for trade, in the presence of transboundary pollution, there is an
ambiguous welfare effect of trade liberalization;
3. if there is no motive for trade, such that the autarky relative price is the same in both
countries, and there is transboundary pollution, then both countries gain (lose) as a result
of a movement from autarky to free trade if
( η
η∗
θ∗
θ
−1)2
η
η∗
θ∗
θ
> (<)16(
γ
δ
+1)
( γ
δ
)2
.
4.5.2 Quotas
Now consider the case when both governments use command and control policies, such as
upper bounds on emissions (or output), instead of taxes, to regulate pollution. Hence, x ≤ L
and x∗ ≤ L∗, where L and L∗ are the production quotas in the home and foreign countries,
respectively. Governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their quota levels to
maximize welfare. Define the (shadow) value of a quota in the home and foreign countries as
τˆ ≡ p − pf and τˆ∗ ≡ p − pf∗, respectively, where pf (pf∗) is the producer price of X in the
home (foreign) country. If the quotas are auctioned off or traded domestically then τˆ and τˆ∗
are the market prices of the quotas in the home and foreign countries, respectively. We assume
that quotas in both countries bind, hence τˆ , τˆ∗ > 0. Differentiating Eq. (4.10) with respect to
L gives the home country’s best response function as a function of the foreign country’s quota
dW
dL
= (x− cx) dp
dL
+ (τˆ − ηθ) dx
dL
− ληθ∗dx
∗
dL
(4.42)
The first and second terms are the terms of trade and domestic pollution effects, respectively,
while the last term is the transboundary pollution effect. The terms of trade effect depends
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on whether the polluting good is an import of the home country. Issuing an additional quota,
given that the quota binds, increases domestic production and domestic emissions. If foreign
production changes following changes in domestic quotas, then it affects domestic welfare via
a change in the home country’s incidence of transboundary pollution.
The foreign country’s best response function as a function of the home country’s quota is
dW ∗
dL∗
= (x∗ − c∗x)
dp
dL∗
+ (τˆ∗ − η∗θ∗) dx
∗
dL∗
− λη∗θ dx
dL∗
(4.43)
Eq.s (4.42) and (4.43) can be solved for the optimal autarky production quotas. In autarky
domestic consumption equals domestic production and the quota binds, i.e., cx = x = L, and
foreign output is independent of domestic policy, i.e., dx
∗
dL = 0. Hence, Eq. (4.42) implies that
the production tax equivalent of the optimal autarky production quota for the home country
is
τˆa = ηθ (4.44)
Similarly, the foreign production tax equivalent of the optimal autarky production quota is
τˆa∗ = η∗θ∗ (4.45)
Comparing Eq.s (4.13), (4.14), (4.44) and (4.45), it can be seen that, under autarky, taxes and
quotas are equivalent.
The optimal autarky quota levels in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
La =
γβ + αδ
γ + δ
− γδ
γ + δ
ηθ, La∗ =
γβ∗ + α∗δ
γ + δ
− γδ
γ + δ
η∗θ∗ (4.46)
Now consider each country’s optimal non-cooperative environmental policy, given a com-
mitment to free trade. The balance of trade condition, Mx + M∗x = 0, implies that the free
trade world (consumer) price of X, in terms of the quota levels in the two countries, is
p =
β + β∗
2δ
− L+ L
∗
2δ
(4.47)
Since quotas in both countries bind, x = L, x∗ = L∗, dx
∗
dL = 0 and
dx
dL∗ = 0, Eq.s (4.42) and
(4.43) imply, respectively,(
3
4δ
+
1
γ
)
L =
(3β + β∗)
4δ
+
α
γ
− ηθ − L
∗
4δ
(4.48)
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(
3
4δ
+
1
γ
)
L∗ =
(3β∗ + β)
4δ
+
α∗
γ
− η∗θ∗ − L
4δ
(4.49)
Solving Eq.s (4.48) and (4.49) simultaneously gives the non-cooperative free trade home and
foreign quota levels2
L =
(2γ + 3δ)γβ + (3γ + 4δ)αδ
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
+
γδ(β∗ − α∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
− γδ ((3γ + 4δ)ηθ − γη
∗θ∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.50)
L∗ =
(2γ + 3δ)γβ∗ + (3γ + 4δ)α∗δ
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
+
γδ(β − α)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
− γδ ((3γ + 4δ)η
∗θ∗ − γηθ)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.51)
Using Eq.s (4.46), (4.50) and (4.51), we can find the change in the quota levels in the two
countries as a result of a movement from autarky to free trade. Given that the quotas bind in
both countries, this is also the change in the production of X due to trade liberalization
∆x = x− xa = L− La = −γδ ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.52)
∆x∗ = x∗ − xa∗ = L∗ − La∗ = γδ ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.53)
The change in the world production of X is
∆xw = ∆x+ ∆x∗ = 0 (4.54)
Proposition 14. If there is no motive for trade between the countries, i.e., if (β−α) +γηθ =
(β∗−α∗)+γη∗θ∗, such that the autarky relative (consumer) price is the same in both countries,
and countries set pollution (or production) quotas non-cooperatively, but otherwise pursue free
trade, then the autarky and free trade equilibrium are the same, i.e., countries do not change
their quota levels due to trade liberalization.
However, if there is motive for trade between the countries, i.e., if (β − α) + γηθ 6= (β∗ −
α∗) + γη∗θ∗, then the effect of trade liberalization on production depends on the natural trade
pattern. If the home country is a natural importer of X, i.e., if (β−α)+γηθ > (β∗−α∗)+γη∗θ∗,
then ∆x < 0 and ∆x∗ > 0.
Proposition 15. If countries set pollution (or production) quotas non-cooperatively, but oth-
erwise pursue free trade, then production (quota level) declines in the natural importer of the
2Note that the home welfare function is strictly concave in L ( d
2W
dL2
= −( 1
γ
+ 3
4δ
)).
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polluting good, and it increases in the natural exporter of the polluting good, while total world
production is unchanged as a result of a movement from autarky to free trade.
The change in total pollution in the home country due to trade liberalization is ∆z =
θ∆L+ λθ∗∆L∗:
∆z = (λθ∗ − θ) γδ ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.55)
Similarly, the change in foreign pollution is
∆z∗ = (θ∗ − λθ) γδ ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.56)
Proposition 16. When countries set pollution (production) quotas non-cooperatively, but
otherwise pursue free trade and if the home country is a natural importer of X, i.e., if
(β − α) + γηθ > (β∗ − α∗) + γη∗θ∗,
1. if the marginal damage from domestic pollution is higher than that from transboundary
pollution, i.e., if λ < 1, then pollution in the home (foreign) country increases when
countries move from autarky to free trade if λ > θθ∗ (λ <
θ∗
θ );
2. if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if λ = 1, then world pollution may rise or
fall due to trade liberalization; if the exporter’s pollution intensity is higher (lower) than
that of the importer’s, i.e., if θ∗ > (<)θ, then pollution increases (decreases).
The change in the home country’s welfare due to a movement from autarky to free trade is
∆W = W −W a, where W and W a are welfare (as measured by Eq. (4.10)) under free trade
and autarky respectively,
∆W =
δ(3γ + 4δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))2
8(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)2
− 4λγδηθ
∗ ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
8(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.57)
If there is no motive for trade, i.e., if (β − α) + γηθ = (β∗ − α∗) + γη∗θ∗, then ∆W =
0. However, if the home country is a natural importer of X, i.e., if (β − α) + γηθ >
(β∗ − α∗) + γη∗θ∗, then it gains from, is unaffected by, or loses from trade liberalization if
((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)) R 4γ(γ+2δ)(3γ+4δ) ληθ∗.
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The change in the foreign country’s welfare due to trade liberalization is
∆W ∗ =
δ(3γ + 4δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))2
8(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)2
+
4λγδη∗θ ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))
8(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.58)
If the foreign country is a natural exporter of X, i.e., if (β − α) + γηθ > (β∗ − α∗) + γη∗θ∗,
then foreign welfare is unambiguously higher under free trade as compared to autarky.
The change in the aggregate (world) welfare due to trade liberalization is ∆Ww = ∆W +
∆W ∗,
∆Ww =
δ(3γ + 4δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗))2
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)2
− 2λγδ ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗)) (ηθ∗ − η∗θ)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.59)
Proposition 17. If countries set pollution (or production) quotas non-cooperatively, but oth-
erwise pursue free trade, then
1. if there is no motive for trade between the countries, i.e., if (β −α) + γηθ = (β∗−α∗) +
γη∗θ∗, such that the autarky relative (consumer) price is the same in both countries,
there is no welfare loss or gain in either country due to trade liberalization and there is
no trade in equilibrium;
2. if there is a motive for trade between the countries, i.e., if (β−α)+γηθ 6= (β∗−α∗)+γη∗θ∗,
the importer of the polluting good may gain or lose from trade liberalization, the exporter
of the polluting good is unambiguously better off under free trade as compared to autarky,
while the effect of trade liberalization on aggregate (world) welfare is ambiguous.
4.6 Special Cases
In this section we look at three special cases of the model developed in this chapter.
4.6.1 Case 1: (β − α)− (β∗ − α∗) + γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗) = 0, ηθ > η∗θ∗
Consider a situation such that, without accounting for the environmental externality, the
home country has a comparative advantage in the polluting good, X, i.e., (β−α) < (β∗−α∗).
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However, ηθ > η∗θ∗, such that γ(ηθ− η∗θ∗) = −((β−α)− (β∗−α∗))⇒ (β−α)− (β∗−α∗) +
γ(ηθ − η∗θ∗) = 0. This can be because the home country suffers a higher marginal disutility
from pollution as compared to the foreign country (η > η∗) or production in the home country
generates more emissions per unit of output as compared to the foreign country (θ > θ∗),
among others.
The free trade Nash equilibrium taxes in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
t = ηθ − λγ ((3γ + 4δ)ηθ
∗ + γη∗θ)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.60)
t∗ = η∗θ∗ − λγ ((3γ + 4δ)η
∗θ + γηθ∗)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.61)
Note that in this case, as there is no terms of trade effect, the transboundary pollution effect,
that tends to lower the domestic environmental tax, reduces the domestic environmental tax
in both countries. Hence, the free trade pollution tax is lower than the optimal autarky
tax in both countries. Furthermore, note that the sum of the taxes in the two countries,
t+ t∗ = ηθ+η∗θ∗− λγ(ηθ∗+η∗θ)(γ+2δ) , is the same irrespective of the presence or absence of the terms
of trade effect.
The change in the production tax on X in the home country, due to trade liberalization, is
t− ta = −λγ ((3γ + 4δ)ηθ
∗ + γη∗θ)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
< 0
and the change in the foreign country’s output tax due to a movement from autarky to free
trade is
t∗ − ta∗ = −λγ ((3γ + 4δ)η
∗θ + γηθ∗)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
< 0
Hence, both countries reduce their tax on X due to trade liberalization.
The change in the home country’s production of X is
∆x =
λγ2 ((γ + 4δ)ηθ∗ − γη∗θ)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.62)
Suppose η∗θ < ηθ∗; then, the home country’s production of X increases due to trade liberal-
ization. Similarly, the change in foreign production of X is
∆x∗ =
λγ2 ((γ + 4δ)η∗θ − γηθ∗)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.63)
79
Hence, ∆x∗ Q 0 as
γ
δ
+4
γ
δ
Q ηη∗
θ∗
θ . The change in the total world production of X is
∆xw = ∆x+ ∆x∗ =
λγ2δ(ηθ∗ + η∗θ)
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.64)
Hence, the change in total world production of X is the same as that in the presence of terms
of trade effects, and is unambiguously positive when countries use taxes to regulate domestic
pollution.
With Pareto efficient taxes (Eq. (4.18)) in both countries, if η∗θ < ηθ∗, given the assump-
tions in this subsection, the home country should export X in the efficient equilibrium. When
countries set domestic taxes non-cooperatively, then the home country exports X
Mx =
λγ2(η∗θ − ηθ∗)
4(γ + δ)
< 0, if η∗θ < ηθ∗
Hence, the free trade tax equilibrium, although inefficient, results in the same direction of
trade as the Pareto efficient equilibrium.
The increase in total pollution in the home and foreign countries due to trade liberalization
are, respectively,
∆z =
λγ2
(
(γ + 4δ)(η + λη∗)θθ∗ − λγ(ηθ∗2 + η∗θ2))
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.65)
∆z∗ =
λγ2
(
(γ + 4δ)(η∗ + λη)θθ∗ − λγ(η∗θ2 + ηθ∗2))
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.66)
When pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., λ = 1, the change in pollution due to a
movement from autarky to free trade is
∆zw =
γ2 (((γ + 4δ)θ∗ − γθ)η∗θ + ((γ + 4δ)θ − γθ∗)ηθ∗)
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.67)
Furthermore, if θ = θ∗, then
∆zw =
γ2δ(η + η∗)θ2
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0
and total world pollution increases as a result of trade liberalization.
The change in the home country’s welfare due to a movement from autarky to free trade is
∆W =
λ2γ2(3γ + 4δ)
(
γ2(ηθ∗ − η∗θ)2 − 16δ(γ + δ)ηη∗θθ∗)
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
(4.68)
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Similarly, the change in foreign welfare resulting from trade liberalization is
∆W ∗ =
λ2γ2(3γ + 4δ)
(
γ2(η∗θ − ηθ∗)2 − 16δ(γ + δ)ηη∗θθ∗)
32(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
(4.69)
Hence, either both countries gain or both lose from trade liberalization. Moreover, the gain
(loss) in welfare in the two countries are identical. Both countries gain (lose) if
( ηη∗
θ∗
θ − 1)2
η
η∗
θ∗
θ
> (<)
16(γδ + 1)
(γδ )
2
As the ratio of the slopes of the supply and demand curves, γδ , increases, it is more likely that
countries gain from trade liberalization. The change in aggregate (world) welfare is
∆Ww =
λ2γ2(3γ + 4δ)
(
γ2(η∗θ − ηθ∗)2 − 16δ(γ + δ)ηη∗θθ∗)
16(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
(4.70)
Now consider the situation when countries use quotas to regulate domestic pollution. From
Eq.s (4.52) and (4.53) we have
∆x = ∆x∗ = 0
Hence, there is no change in the pollution level in either country due to trade liberalization.
Furthermore, Eq.s (4.57) and (4.58) imply that neither country gains or loses as a result of
moving from autarky to free trade. However, although there is no trade, the free trade quota
equilibrium is also inefficient as countries do not internalize the effect of their emissions on
the other country’s welfare and the home country should export X in the Pareto efficient
equilibrium.
Under the assumptions made in this subsection, we find that both countries lower their
environmental tax and total world production of the polluting good increases under free trade
as compared to autarky. Also, if pollution is a pure global public good, then pollution increases
as a result of trade liberalization when both countries use an environmental tax to regulate
domestic pollution. However, when the policy instrument is a quota, then there is no change
in quota levels (hence, production and pollution) and welfare in either country due to the
movement from autarky to free trade.
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4.6.2 Case 2: (β − α) = (β∗ − α∗), θ∗ = θ, λ = 1, η > η∗
Now consider another situation when pollution is a pure global public bad (λ = 1) and the
only difference between the two countries is in their marginal disutility from pollution. Assume
that η > η∗, θ∗ = θ and β − α = β∗ − α∗. The free trade Nash equilibrium taxes in the home
and foreign countries are, respectively,
t = ηθ − γθ ((2γ + 3δ)η − δη
∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.71)
t∗ = η∗θ − γθ ((2γ + 3δ)η
∗ − δη)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.72)
Note that, as shown before, the sum of the taxes in the two countries is t + t∗ = (η + η∗)θ −
γθ(η+η∗)
(γ+2δ) , and depends only on the pollution parameters, η, η
∗ and θ, and the slopes of the
demand and supply curves, δ and γ.
The change in the production tax on the polluting good, X, in the home country is
t− ta = −γθ ((2γ + 3δ)η − δη
∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
< 0
Hence, the terms of trade effect and the transboundary pollution effect lead to lower environ-
mental tax on X in the home country under free trade as compared to autarky. The change
in the foreign country’s output tax due to a movement from autarky to free trade is
t∗ − ta∗ = −γθ ((2γ + 3δ)η
∗ − δη)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
Since η > η∗, the foreign country is a natural exporter of X, so the terms of trade effect (that
tends to increase the tax on X) and the transboundary pollution effect (that tends to reduce
the tax on X) work in opposite directions. The foreign country also reduces its tax on X due
to trade liberalization if ηη∗ < 2
γ
δ + 3. Hence, as the ratio of the slopes of the supply and
demand curves, γδ , increases, it is more likely that the foreign country also reduces its tax on
X. Also, the more similar both countries’ preferences are towards pollution, the more likely it
is that the foreign country also reduces its output tax. A sufficient condition for both countries
to reduce their environmental taxes is η∗ < η < 3η∗.
The change in the home country’s production of X is
∆x =
γ2δθ(η + η∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.73)
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Hence, the home country’s production of X increases due to trade liberalization. Similarly,
the change in foreign production of X is
∆x∗ =
γ2δθ(η + η∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.74)
and, the foreign country also increases its production of X due to a movement from autarky
to free trade. The change in the total world production of X is
∆xw =
γ2δθ(η + η∗)
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.75)
which is unambiguously positive when countries use taxes to regulate domestic pollution.
Under the assumptions of this subsection, with Pareto efficient taxes, there is no trade
in equilibrium. However, in the free trade equilibrium, when countries use taxes to regulate
pollution, the home country imports X,
Mx =
γδθ(η − η∗)
2(γ + δ)
> 0
Hence, the free trade equilibrium results in positive trade flows, whereas the Pareto efficient
equilibrium results in no trade.
The change in pollution due to trade liberalization is
∆zw = θ∆xw =
γ2δθ2(η + η∗)
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.76)
Thus, pollution increases when countries move from autarky to free trade when both countries
use taxes to regulate pollution.
The change in the home country’s welfare due to a movement from autarky to free trade is
∆W = −γ
2δθ2
[
(4γ2 + 9γδ + 4δ2)η2 + 2(4γ2 + 11γδ + 8δ2)ηη∗ − δ(3γ + 4δ)η∗2]
8(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
< 0 (4.77)
Since η > η∗, ∆W < 0 and the home country loses as a result of trade liberalization. The
change in the foreign country’s welfare resulting from trade liberalization is
∆W ∗ = −γ
2δθ2
[
(4γ2 + 9γδ + 4δ2)η∗2 + 2(4γ2 + 11γδ + 8δ2)ηη∗ − δ(3γ + 4δ)η2]
8(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
(4.78)
Hence, the foreign country loses (gains) from trade liberalization if(
3
γ
δ
+ 4
)( η
η∗
)2
< (>)
[
4
(γ
δ
)2
+ 9
(γ
δ
)
+ 4
]
+ 2
[
4
(γ
δ
)2
+ 11
(γ
δ
)
+ 8
]
η
η∗
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The change in aggregate (world) welfare is
∆Ww = −γ
2δθ2
[
γ(2γ + 3δ)η2 + 2(4γ2 + 11γδ + 8δ2)ηη∗ + γ(2γ + 3δ)η∗2
]
4(γ + δ)2(γ + 2δ)2
< 0 (4.79)
Hence, when countries use taxes to regulate pollution, aggregate welfare is unambiguously
lower under free trade as compared to autarky.
Now consider the case when countries use quotas to regulate domestic pollution. The
non-cooperative free trade home and foreign quota levels are, respectively,
L =
γβ + αδ
γ + δ
− γδθ ((3γ + 4δ)η − γη
∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.80)
L∗ =
γβ∗ + α∗δ
γ + δ
− γδθ ((3γ + 4δ)η
∗ − γη)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.81)
The change in the production of X due to trade liberalization in the home and foreign countries
are3, respectively,
∆x = x− xa = L− La = − γ
2δθ(η − η∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
< 0 (4.82)
∆x∗ = x∗ − xa∗ = L∗ − La∗ = γ
2δθ(η − η∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.83)
and the change in the world production of X is
∆xw = ∆x+ ∆x∗ = 0 (4.84)
The home country imports X,
Mx =
γδθ(η − η∗)
(γ + 2δ)
> 0
in the free trade quota equilibrium, while there is no trade in the Pareto efficient equilibrium.
Given that there is no change in the world production of X between autarky and free trade,
there is also no change in pollution, i.e.,
∆zw = 0 (4.85)
The change in the home and foreign welfare due to trade liberalization are, respectively,
∆W = −γ
2δθ2(η − η∗) [(3γ + 4δ)η∗ + (γ + 4δ)η]
8(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)2
< 0 (4.86)
3Since the quotas bind in both countries, this is also the change in the quota levels.
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∆W ∗ =
γ2δθ2(η − η∗) [(3γ + 4δ)η + (γ + 4δ)η∗]
8(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)2
> 0 (4.87)
Hence, the home country loses and the foreign country gains from trade liberalization when
both countries use quotas to regulate domestic pollution. The change in aggregate (world)
welfare is
∆Ww =
γ3δθ2(η − η∗)2
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)2
> 0 (4.88)
Thus, when countries use quotas to regulate pollution, aggregate welfare increases due to trade
liberalization, whereas when countries use taxes to regulate pollution, world welfare declines
due to a movement from autarky to free trade.
When countries use taxes to regulate pollution, then under the assumptions of this subsec-
tion, production of the polluting good increases in both countries as a result of trade liberal-
ization. Pollution increases and aggregate (world) welfare decreases due to the movement from
autarky to free trade. However, when the policy instrument is a quota on production (or pollu-
tion), then production of X declines (increases) in the country with a higher (lower) marginal
disutility from pollution, while aggregate (world) production and pollution are unchanged due
to trade liberalization. The country with a higher marginal disutility from pollution loses, while
the other country gains from trade liberalization and aggregate (world) welfare is higher under
free trade as compared to autarky when quotas are the policy instruments in both countries.
4.6.3 Case 3: (β − α) > (β∗ − α∗), η∗ = η, θ∗ = θ
Here we consider the situation in which there is no difference between the countries with
respect to pollution intensity or preference towards the environment, i.e., η∗ = η and θ∗ =
θ. However, there are differences in the demand and supply schedules of the two countries;
specifically, the home country is a natural importer of the polluting good, X, i.e., (β − α) >
(β∗ − α∗).
The free trade non-cooperative home and foreign country taxes on the production of X
are, respectively,
t = ηθ − (β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗)
4(γ + δ)
− λγηθ
(γ + 2δ)
(4.89)
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t∗ = ηθ +
(β − α)− (β∗ − α∗)
4(γ + δ)
− λγηθ
(γ + 2δ)
(4.90)
The sum of the taxes in the two countries is t+ t∗ = 2(ηθ− λγηθ(γ+2δ)). The home country reduces
its output tax due to trade liberalization
t− ta = −(β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗)
4(γ + δ)
− λγηθ
(γ + 2δ)
< 0
This is because the terms of trade effect and the transboundary pollution effect reinforce each
other to reduce t under free trade as compared to autarky. The change in the foreign country’s
tax due to trade liberalization is
t∗ − ta∗ = (β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗)
4(γ + δ)
− λγηθ
(γ + 2δ)
The terms of trade effect and the transboundary pollution effect work in opposite directions in
the foreign country; hence, t∗ < ta∗ if the transboundary pollution effect dominates the terms
of trade effect, i.e., if λγηθ(γ+2δ) >
(β−α)−(β∗−α∗)
4(γ+δ) .
The change in the home and foreign production of X due to a movement from autarky to
free trade are, respectively,
∆x = −γ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗))
4(γ + δ)
+
λγ2δηθ
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
(4.91)
∆x∗ =
γ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗))
4(γ + δ)
+
λγ2δηθ
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.92)
Hence, ∆x > 0 if 4λγδηθ > (γ + 2δ)((β − α) − (β∗ − α∗)), and ∆x∗ > 0. The change in the
world production of X as a result of trade liberalization is
∆xw = ∆x+ ∆x∗ =
λγ2δηθ
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.93)
i.e., total (world) production of X is unambiguously higher under free trade as compared to
autarky.
Given the assumptions of this subsection, the home country imports X in the Pareto
efficient equilibrium. When countries use taxes to regulate pollution, then the home country
imports X in the free trade equilibrium,
Mx =
(γ + 2δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗))
4(γ + δ)
> 0
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and, although the free trade tax equilibrium is inefficient, it results in the same direction of
trade as the Pareto efficient equilibrium.
The change in the home and foreign pollution due to a movement from autarky to free
trade are, respectively,
∆z =
(1 + λ)λγ2δηθ2
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
− (1− λ)θ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗))
4(γ + δ)
(4.94)
∆z∗ =
(1 + λ)λγ2δηθ2
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
+
(1− λ)θ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗))
4(γ + δ)
> 0 (4.95)
Although domestic pollution may increase or decrease due to trade liberalization, foreign pol-
lution unambiguously increases. Furthermore, if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if
λ = 1, then
∆zw =
2γ2δηθ2
(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.96)
and pollution unambiguously increases under free trade as compared to autarky.
The change in the home country’s welfare due to trade liberalization is
∆W =
λ2γ2η2θ2
32(γ + 2δ)2
[
(3µ+ 4)R2 − 16R− 16(3µ+ 4)
µ(µ+ 1)
]
(4.97)
where, µ ≡ γδ and R ≡ (γ+2δ)λγηθ (β−α)−(β
∗−α∗)
(γ+δ) . Hence, ∆W R 0 as (3µ+4)R2−16R− 16(3µ+4)µ(µ+1) R 0.
Similarly, the change in the foreign country’s welfare under free trade as compared to autarky
is
∆W ∗ =
λ2γ2η2θ2
32(γ + 2δ)2
[
(3µ+ 4)R2 + 16R− 16(3µ+ 4)
µ(µ+ 1)
]
(4.98)
and the change in aggregate (world) welfare as a result of a movement from autarky to free
trade is
∆Ww =
λ2γ2η2θ2(3µ+ 4)
16(γ + 2δ)2
[
R2 − 16
µ(µ+ 1)
]
(4.99)
Hence, aggregate welfare increases (decreases) due to trade liberalization if R2 > (<) 16µ(µ+1) .
When both countries use quotas to regulate emissions, the home and foreign free trade
quota levels are, respectively,
L =
(2γ + 3δ)γβ + (3γ + 4δ)αδ + γδ(β∗ − α∗)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
− γδ
γ + δ
ηθ (4.100)
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L∗ =
(2γ + 3δ)γβ∗ + (3γ + 4δ)α∗δ + γδ(β − α)
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
− γδ
γ + δ
ηθ (4.101)
If the home country is a natural importer of X, the change in the production of X due to trade
liberalization in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
∆x = −γδ ((β − α)− (β
∗ − α∗))
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
< 0 (4.102)
∆x∗ =
γδ ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗))
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.103)
and the change in world production of X is
∆xw = ∆x+ ∆x∗ = 0 (4.104)
Hence, the home (foreign) country’s production of X decreases (increases), while total world
production is unchanged due to trade liberalization.
In the Pareto efficient equilibrium, the home country is an importer of X, and in the free
trade quota equilibrium, the home country also imports X,
Mx =
δ ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗))
(γ + 2δ)
> 0
Hence, the direction of trade are the same in the Pareto efficient and free trade quota equilibria,
although the latter is inefficient.
The change in total pollution in the home country due to trade liberalization is
∆z = θ∆x+ λθ∆x∗ =
θ(λ− 1)γδ ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗))
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
< 0 (4.105)
Similarly, the change in foreign pollution is
∆z∗ = θ∆x∗ + λθ∆x =
θ(1− λ)γδ ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗))
2(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)
> 0 (4.106)
However, when pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., λ = 1, pollution is unchanged as
countries move from autarky to free trade.
The change in the home and foreign country’s welfare due to trade liberalization are,
respectively,
∆W =
δ ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗)) ((3γ + 4δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗))− 4λγ(γ + 2δ)ηθ)
8(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)2
(4.107)
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∆W ∗ =
δ ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗)) ((3γ + 4δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗)) + 4λγ(γ + 2δ)ηθ)
8(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)2
> 0
(4.108)
Hence, the home country gains (loses) from trade liberalization if (β − α) − (β∗ − α∗) > (<
)4λγηθ(γ+2δ)(3γ+4δ) , and the foreign country always gains from trade liberalization. The change in
aggregate (world) welfare is
∆Ww =
δ(3γ + 4δ) ((β − α)− (β∗ − α∗))2
4(γ + δ)(γ + 2δ)2
> 0 (4.109)
Thus, when countries use quotas to regulate pollution, aggregate welfare increases due to trade
liberalization due to a movement from autarky to free trade.
When countries use taxes to regulate pollution, then under the assumptions made in this
subsection, the natural importer of the polluting good lowers its environmental tax and the
natural exporter may also reduce its tax, while total world production of X unambiguously
increases due to trade liberalization. If pollution is a pure global public bad, then pollution is
unambiguously higher under free trade as compared to autarky, although the effect of trade
liberalization on aggregate world welfare is ambiguous. However, when both countries use
quotas to regulate pollution, production of the polluting good and pollution in the natural
importer (exporter) of X fall (rise), while total world production is unchanged due to trade
liberalization. Aggregate world welfare is unambiguously higher under free trade as compared
to autarky when the policy instrument in both countries is a quota on pollution.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have extended the analysis of the previous chapter and explicitly mod-
eled differences between countries that are involved in bilateral trade and are also affected
by transboundary pollution from each other. Due to the presence of the transboundary pol-
lution externality, Pareto efficiency requires that countries internalize both the domestic and
transboundary effects of their emissions. Hence, the autarky equilibrium, in which countries
internalize the domestic effects of pollution, but not the transboundary effects, is inefficient.
We find that, even in the presence of (intrinsic) gains from trade, countries may lose from trade
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liberalization if the welfare loss from increased pollution in the trading equilibrium dominates
the gains from trade.
We find that, if the source of comparative advantage is the difference in preference towards
pollution and pollution is a pure global public bad, then the country that suffers a higher
marginal damage from pollution lowers its tax on the polluting good in the free trade equi-
librium as compared to autarky. The other country may also lower its tax on the polluting
good due to trade liberalization. The production of the polluting good (hence, pollution)
unambiguously increases in both countries with trade liberalization, while aggregate (world)
welfare declines when the policy instrument is a tax. However, when countries use quotas
to regulate pollution, production of the polluting good decreases in the country that suffers
a higher marginal disutility from pollution, while it increases in the other country, so that
world production (hence, pollution) is unchanged as a result of a movement from autarky
to free trade. Aggregate (world) welfare is higher under free trade as compared to autarky.
Hence, comparing aggregate (world) welfare, the free trade quota equilibrium strictly welfare
dominates the tax equilibrium. Again, this indicates that, in the presence of an international
transboundary externality, when countries negotiate on free trade agreements, it might be
beneficial to negotiate on the policy instrument that will be used in the countries to regulate
the domestic externality.
We have analyzed the effect of trade liberalization on pollution and welfare in a static two
country model. It would be interesting to extend this analysis to a dynamic model where pol-
lution is a stock externality and look at the ranking of policy instruments. Another interesting
avenue for future research is to analyze the effect of trade liberalization on pollution and wel-
fare when, apart from the two large countries, there are other small (policy inactive) countries
present and there is a change in production (hence, emissions) in these countries also.
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUDING REMARKS
This dissertation analyzed optimal banking sector recapitalization programs and looked at
the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policy, pollution and welfare when coun-
tries set domestic environmental policies non-cooperatively in the presence of an international
transboundary externality.
In Chapter 2 we analyzed the Ramsey-optimal paths of banking sector recapitalization
programs in the aftermath of a banking crisis. This is the first attempt at examining the
public-finance aspect of the problem and the high fiscal costs of such programs underscores the
importance of this analysis. We considered three different sources of financing: the government
borrows from international debt markets to recapitalize banks, it funds the recapitalization
program using non-distortionary (lump-sum) taxes and distortionary taxes are used to finance
the recapitalization program.
Our results indicate that it is optimal to immediately recapitalize banks after a crisis if the
government has access to international debt. Furthermore, by borrowing from international
debt markets, the government can achieve perfect consumption smoothing. Without access to
international debt, when lump-sum taxes finance the recapitalization program, it is not optimal
to recapitalize banks immediately and when distortionary taxes are used, recapitalization of
the bankrupt banking sector is even slower.
Although it has often been suggested that the government should restructure the banking
system in one shot, we have shown that optimality requires a gradual approach unless the
economy can borrow from international markets. This highlights the importance of having
access to international debt markets during periods of financial distress. Thus, our results
provide a rationale for international organizations extending emergency financing to developing
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countries that are recapitalizing their banking sectors in the aftermath of banking crises.
In Chapter 3 we explored the effects of a movement from autarky to free trade in the
presence of transboundary pollution in a strategic setting. Pareto efficiency in such a situation
requires that countries internalize both the domestic and transboundary welfare effects of its
pollution; hence, the autarky equilibrium is inefficient as countries internalize only the former.
When countries use taxes to regulate pollution, trade liberalization can result in a race to
the bottom in environmental taxes, that is welfare reducing. This is because of the transbound-
ary pollution effect, which, due to carbon leakage, increases the incidence of transboundary
pollution in the free trade equilibrium when countries regulate domestic pollution, thereby
reducing the marginal benefit of regulating domestic pollution under free trade as compared
to autarky. When the policy instrument is a quota, then there is no race to the bottom in
environmental policy. However, when countries pursue free trade in goods and pollution per-
mits, the outcome of trade liberalization depends on the public good nature of pollution. If
pollution is a pure global public bad, there is no race to the bottom, but, if pollution is not a
pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy that leaves both
countries worse off under free trade relative to autarky.
The internationally nontradable quota equilibrium welfare-dominates the internationally
tradable quota equilibrium and is strictly welfare-superior to the tax equilibrium. We show
that, even in the absence of terms of trade motives, purely the incentive, in a strategic setting,
to under-regulate the domestic externality to reduce the incidence of the transboundary ex-
ternality, can result in a race to the bottom in pollution policies, which leaves both countries
worse off due to trade liberalization. Hence, when countries negotiate on free trade agreements,
even if they do not negotiate on the exact level of the domestic policy, it might be beneficial to
negotiate on the policy instrument that will be used to regulate the domestic externality due
to the non-equivalence of policy instruments in the free trade equilibrium.
Chapter 4 extended the analysis of the previous chapter to explicitly model differences
between two countries that are affected by transboundary pollution from each other and set
domestic environmental policies non-cooperatively under free trade. The autarky and free trade
92
equilibria are both Pareto inefficient. We find that, even in the presence of potential gains from
trade due to difference between the countries, the welfare loss from increased pollution in the
free trade equilibrium may dominate and result in a net welfare loss from trade liberalization.
We analyzed some special cases and found that when pollution is a pure global public bad
and the only source of comparative advantage stems from a difference in preference towards
pollution between the two countries, pollution is higher (unchanged) under free trade when
countries use taxes (quotas) to regulate pollution, as compared to autarky. Comparing ag-
gregate (world) welfare, we find that the free trade quota equilibrium is welfare superior to
autarky which is, in turn, welfare superior to the free trade tax equilibrium.
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